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The roll out of green technologies in the United States during the
early part of the twenty-first century has involved modernizing and
redeploying existing technologies. Some of these technologies were
developed centuries ago to capture natural phenomena, such as wind
energy from windmills. One of these "new" technologies involves
capturing rain on a small scale before it becomes runoff. This
rainwater harvesting' has the potential to become one of the greenest
technologies because it combines many of the attributes that make the
green label attractive: the deployment of simple, low impact materials
and methods; the consumption of locally produced resources; and the
ability to reduce or eliminate dependence on an industrialized public
utility grid.2 Additionally, rainwater harvesting is especially
attractive because it utilizes a natural resource that would otherwise
be wasted. Despite these attractions, rainwater harvesting was illegal
*William Volkman Associate Professor of Business & Law, Wheaton College;
B.A., 1983, College of William & Mary; J.D., 1986, University of Colorado Law
School. An acknowledgment of thanks is owed to Terry O'Reilly for his insightful
comments and criticisms, to Wheaton College for providing the time to research
and write this article, and to P.J. Hill for his mentorship.
1. As used in this article, the terms "rain" and "rainwater" include snow,
snowmelt, sleet, and other forms of precipitation.
2. See BEORN COURTNEY, HEADWATERS CORP., RAINWATER AND SNOWMELT
HARVESTING IN COLORADo 3 (2008), www.allianceforwaterefficiency.org/
WorkArea! showcontent.aspx?id=2664.
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in Colorado prior to 2009 due to the prior appropriation doctrine,3 the
foundation of Colorado's water law.4
As a raindrop falls to the earth in Colorado, various property right
holders on the ground wait to assert their claims on the use of that
raindrop's water. The strength of those property rights and the degree
to which they are impaired by rainwater harvesting depend on where
the raindrop falls and whether its water becomes tributary to a stream
system or nontributary ground water.5  Rainwater harvesting
potentially interferes with stronger water rights, such as when a
rainwater harvester diverts and uses water before a more senior water
rights owner can divert and use the water despite the latter's state
authorized priority of appropriation.6
Learning that rain is owned by someone else, and that positioning
rain barrels beneath downspouts constitutes the taking of property of
another can be disconcerting for homeowners, who also happen to be
voters. In fact, such a large portion of these voters actually voiced
their shock, amazement, and displeasure in Colorado that the
Colorado General Assembly responded.7 In 2009 the legislature
passed, and the governor signed, two bills that allow rainwater
harvesting under limited circumstances.8  Senate Bill 09-080
authorizes small-scale residential rainwater harvesting,9 while House
Bill 09-1129 authorizes larger, development-wide rainwater
harvesting on a pilot project basis.'o Both statutes point toward
possible broader rainwater harvesting initiatives in Colorado in the
future."
3. See infra Part III.
4. See GEORGE VRANESH, VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAW 8 (James N.
Corbridge & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1999).
5. See infra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
7. See Steven K. Paulson, Get Out Your Rain Barrels; New Law Lets Some of
You Collect Water, THE GAZETTE (July 1, 2009, 6:10 AM),
http://www.gazette.com/articles/barrels-57687-colorado-denver.html.
8. R. Scott Rappold, New Laws Open the Way for Rain Barrels, For Some,
THE GAZETTE (June 2, 2009, 5:42 PM), http://www.gazette.com/articles/water-
55602-rain-bill.html.
9. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-105(l)(f), 37-92-602(1)(g) (2010).
10. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-60-115(6). See generally COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-
92-308(4)-(5).
11. See infra Part III.
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Given existing water property rights and the protection afforded to
certain water rights by Colorado's relatively strict application of the
prior appropriation doctrine,12 rainwater harvesting legislation both
current and future rainwater harvesting legislation potentially creates
a takings claim under the United States and Colorado Constitutions.' 3
Successful takings claims by senior water rights owners whose
property rights are materially injured by state-authorized rainwater
harvesting could result in the payment of just compensation.14
Further, the specter of doling out money from the public treasury to
existing water rights owners makes addressing the concerns of
homeowners who want to harvest rainwater potentially more
complicated for elected officials than simply passing enabling laws.
Since takings of private property are protected by the constitutional
* - *15limitations of a public use and just compensation, opposing political
pressures exerted by potential rainwater harvesters and existing water
rights owners raise issues about the nature of water property rights
and the extent to which water rights are protected from government
regulations. Recently, these issues arose in the takings context when
the California state government prohibited agricultural irrigators from
divertin% water to maintain instream flows to protect endangered
species. This type of government prohibition may primarily be seen
in California.17 The results of various lawsuits have been mixed, with
environmentalists winning in some cases and existing water rights
owners winning other cases.' 8
12. The pure form of the prior appropriation doctrine implemented in Colorado
has earned the title of the "Colorado Doctrine." VRANESH, supra note 4, at 32. See
generally Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs. v. Park Cnty. Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP, 45 P.3d
693, 704-06 (Colo. 2002).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; COLo. CONST.
art. II, § 15.
14. COLO. CONST. art. II, §15 (requiring the payment of just compensation for a
takings).
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 100-02
(2007).
17. See infra Part IV.C.4.
18. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 505
(2005) (holding that the temporary reduction of water available for irrigation by the
Bureau of Reclamation was not a taking); Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United
States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that a Bureau of Reclamation
directive to divert water to operate a fish ladder constituted an "uncompensated
physical taking").
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The strength of a takings claim depends in part on the strength of
the water rights owner's underlying water property rightl 9 and the
nature of the government action.20 In Colorado, water property rights
are stronger than they are in California,21 and the transfer of a water-
use right from one private water user to another is a less compelling
rationale than transferring water rights to maintain instream flows for
an endangered species' benefit.22 Evaluating the takings potential of
recent and potential Colorado legislation is an exercise in
determining whether appropriative water rights can ever be
considered a property right that is constitutionally protected from a
regulatory taking.23 While the answer favors the interests of water
rights owners, the answer is by no means certain due to hurdles that
water rights owners must cross and the murkiness of the United
States Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence.24
This article argues that legislation in Colorado authorizing
rainwater harvesting creates the potential for a taking by effectively
transferring water rights from one private party to another private
party. Rainwater harvesting in Colorado thus becomes a means of
testing whether property rights in water can be protected from
regulatory takings due to the relatively strong protections afforded to
senior water rights under Colorado law. Section I of this Article
describes rainwater harvesting and its benefits. Section II explains
how the application of the prior appropriation doctrine in Colorado
renders rainwater harvesting illegal. Section III describes recent
legislation authorizing rainwater harvesting on a limited basis in
Colorado. Section IV examines whether current statutes and future
legislation that expands rainwater harvesting may constitute a taking.
I. RAINWATER HARVESTING
"He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and
sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous."
19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. See infra Part IV.C.
21. See infra Part IV.B.
22. See supra note 18.
23. See generally infra Part IV.
24. See Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Public and Private Property Rights:
Regulatory and Physical Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REv. 421, 427 (2005).
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Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount25
Current Colorado rainwater harvesting statutes do not result in a
taking because they were carefully drafted to work within the
confines of the prior appropriation doctrine.26 However, potentially
broader legislation could result in a taking because such legislation
would affect stronger water property rights in water and the diversion
of water caused by rainwater harvesting systems brings into play a
categorical rule that applies to regulations that amount to a physical
taking.
Rainwater harvesting is the process of capturing and storing
rainwater for later use.27 Native Americans in the southwestern
United States harvested rainwater for thousands of years to
supplement water captured from surface water, springs, and other
sources for domestic use, agricultural irrigation, and livestock
watering.28 Rainwater harvesting is not a new phenomenon, and the
technology used to capture and store rainwater continues to be simple
and inexpensive. 29 A typical rainwater harvesting system in the
western United States uses the roof of a structure to catch rain, a first
flush device to remove accumulated debris flushed from the roof by
the rain, a network of gutters and drainpipes to route the water, and
an above-ground tank or underground cistern to store the water. 30 A
filtration system may also be needed if the water will be used for
drinking water or other household uses.31
25. Matthew 5:45 (New Int'l Version), available at
http://www.turnbacktogod.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/The-Holy-Bible-New-
International-Version.pdf.
26. See infra Part II.
27. COLO. DIv. OF WATER RES., GRAYWATER SYSTEMS AND RAINWATER
HARVESTING IN COLORADO 2 (2003), http://water.state.co.us/dwripub/
documents/waterharvesting.pdf [hereinafter GRAYWATER SYSTEMS].
28. See Troy L. Payne & Jane Neuman, Remembering Rain, 37 ENVTL. L. 105,
121 (2007).
29. See COURTNEY, supra note 2, at 5.
30. See Payne & Neuman, supra note 28, at 107-10; R. Waskom & J.
Kallenberger, Graywater Use and Rainwater Harvesting, in NATURAL RESOURCE
SERIES: WATER 2009 (Colo. State Univ. Extension, Ser. No. 6.702, 2009),
http://www.ext.colostate.edu/pubs/natres/06702.pdf.
31. COURTNEY,supra note 2, at 2.
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Several attributes make rainwater harvesting attractive as an
ecologically friendly activity. For example, through the use of low
tech methods, a local resource in the form of rain is harvested and
used locally, thus avoiding the costs and energy use associated with
transporting water over long distances.32 Rainwater harvesting is also
energy efficient, justifying the inclusion of rainwater harvesting
systems in the U.S. Green Building Council's Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design ("LEED") Green Building Rating
System's point structure. 33 These energy efficiencies combined with
the small scale, self-sufficient nature of rainwater harvesting allows
property owners and building residents to lower their own energy
costs by reducing or eliminating their dependence on a public water
utility's grid. For public water utilities, customers going "off the
grid" can relieve pressures created by capacity constraints, especially
at peak periods. 34 With a cost structure consisting of high fixed costs
and lower variable costs, the downside for public water utilities of too
many customers going "off the grid" is the loss of revenue from
reduced water delivery fees. 35 For those already "off the grid,"
rainwater harvesting provides an additional water source when
ground water sources are not potable, reliable, or otherwise
available. 3 6 Rainwater harvesting also allows property owners and
building residents to use water that may not become part of surface
water and ground water systems. In a Colorado Water Conservation
Board study, several units of local government, including water and
sanitation districts and a homeowners association, examined the fate
of precipitation falling in northwest Douglas County, a populous area
located in the foothills and plains east of the Rocky Mountains
between Denver and Colorado Springs.37 The study noted that
32. Id. at 3-4.
33. See Peter A. Nelson, Measuring from the High Watermark: Defining
Baselines for Water Efficiency in Green Buildings, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 105, 106-07, 117 (2008); Charles J. Kilbert, Green Buildings: An Overview
ofProgress, 19 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 491, 495 (2004).
34. COURTNEY, supra note 2, at 3.
35. Payne & Neuman, supra note 28, at 133-34.
36. M. Subramanian, Rainwater Harvesting Catches the Attention of State and
Local Government, 12 W. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 226, 226-28 (2008) [hereinafter
Rainwater Harvesting].
37. See generally COLO. WATER CONSERVATION. BD., HOLISTIC APPROACH TO
SUSTAINABLE WATER MANAGEMENT IN NORTHWEST DOUGLAS COUNTY (2007),
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"precipitation falling on undeveloped sites is consumed during the
growing season (typically April through October at this location) by
native vegetation evapotranspiration processes and is lost through
evaporation and sublimation processes during the non-growing
season."38 From 1950 to 2004, the average loss of water to
evapotranspiration and sublimation on undeveloped sites was
"equivalent to 97% of the total precipitation." 39 In a wet year, the
maximum evapotranspiration and sublimation rate was 85%, so that
only 15% of the precipitation falling was held as moisture in the soil
or returned to surface water or ground water sources. 40 In a dry year,
100% of the precipitation was lost to evapotranspiration and
sublimation so that no water returned as surface or ground water.4 1
Rainwater harvesting thus provides an opportunity to capture water
that would otherwise be lost to evaporation and similar processes in
the water cycle.
Capturing water that would otherwise be lost to human
consumption is also critical in the face of water shortages caused by
population growth, drought, and climate change. According to the
2004 Colorado Statewide Water Supply Initiative, "[s]ignificant
increases in Colorado's population - together with agricultural water
needs and an increased focus on recreational and environmental uses
- will intensify competition for water."4 2 Colorado's population has
been projected to increase from approximately 4.3 million in 2000 to
approximately 7.1 million in 2030, a sixty-five percent increase, with
approximately eighty-one percent living along the urbanized Front
Range on the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains. 4 3 During this
same time period, urban water demands for industrial, commercial,
and domestic uses will increase from almost 1.2 million acre-feet to
over 1.8 million acre-feet, or an increase in demand of 630,000 acre-
http://cwcbweblink.state.co.us/WebLink/0/doc/105705/Electronic.aspx [hereinafter
DOUGLAS COUNTY WATER STUDY].
38. Id. at 21.
39. Id. at 24.
40. Id. at 1, 24.
4 1. Id. at 1.
42. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION. BD., STATEWIDE WATER SUPPLY INITIATIVE
ES-7 (2004), http://cwcbweblink.state.co.us/weblink/0/doc/144066/Electronic.aspx
[hereinafter STATEWIDE WATER SUPPLY INITIATIVE].
43. Population Totals for Colorado & Sub-State Regions; Forecast Tables,
COLO. DEP'T OF LOCAL AFF., ST. DEMOGRAPHY OFF., http://dola.colorado.gov/dlg/
demog/popcolo forecasts.html (last updated Oct. 2010).
2011] 165
166 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA WREVIEW
feet." Under an optimistic scenario, approximately eighty percent of
this excess demand can be met by current and future water projects
and processes, leaving a shortfall of over 118,000 acre-feet.45
Rainwater harvesting has been identified as one of the means by
46
which to bridge this gap. According to a study prepared, in part, for
the Colorado Water Conservation Board, rainwater and snowmelt
harvesting could reduce outdoor water demand by approximately
sixty five to eighty-eight percent when combined with active water
management techniques ranging from "moderate conservation" to
"water wise conservation" scenarios.4 7 Due to increased urban water
demands and the inability of existing and planned water projects to
meet those demands in Colorado, water will shift away from
agricultural use since, "historically, over [ninety] percent of
[Colorado]'s water use has been associated with agriculture." 48 This
percentage is expected to decrease as urban water providers purchase
water rights from agricultural irrigators, thus transferring water rights
from lower value uses to higher value uses. 4 9 However, transaction
costs and an anticommons inhibit these transfers. Generally, an
anticommons occurs when multiple individuals or entities have rights
of exclusion or veto rights, especially when the exclusion rights are
not linked to use rights.5 0 Exclusion rights holders can undermine use
44. STATEWIDE WATER SUPPLY INITIATIVE, supra note 42, at ES-9. An acre-
foot is enough water to cover an acre of land with one foot of water, or about
325,851 gallons of water. Acre-foot, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 24 (7th ed. 1999).
45. STATEWIDE WATER SUPPLY INITIATIVE, supra note 42, at ES-13.
46. DAVID BEAUJON, COLO. LEGIS. COUNCIL STAFF, RAINWATER HARVESTING
IN COLORADO 1 (2009), available at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/
Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader-application%2Fpdf&blobkey-id&blobtable
=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251597990496&ssbinary=true.
47. DOUGLAS COUNTY WATER STUDY, supra note 37, at 2.
48. STATEWIDE WATER SUPPLY INITIATIVE, supra note 42, at ES-10.
49. See generally Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, Water Markets as a
Tragedy of the Anticommons, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. REV. 723
(2009). This differential in value between agricultural and urban uses of water
occurs at the margin (or marginal value). While the water used for agricultural
irrigation in a particular location may have a high average value, the marginal value
of the last unit of water used can be much lower than the average value. See id. at
744.
50. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998).
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rights resulting in an under-use of the resource.5 1 An anticommons
exists in the water markets of western states due to multiple rights of
exclusion. These factors include the historical development of water
institutions, such as mutual ditch companies, irrigation districts, and
the Bureau of Reclamation, with its public and private governance
rules regarding the transfer of water rights, and the expansion of legal
doctrines affecting water rights, such as the public trust doctrine.52
These multiple exclusion rights create opportunities for numerous
parties to claim injury from a water rights transfer, which must be
addressed by the use right holder through private negotiations or
litigation.53 By increasing the transaction costs of water transfers
through the exercise of exclusion rights, the anticommons makes
transfers of water from its historically predominant use in agriculture
to newer and growing demands for residential, commercial, and
environmental uses difficult and expensive. 54 Rainwater harvesting
provides a means by which to circumvent these transaction costs,
especially for small scale residential uses of water. Rainwater
harvesting transfers the prior right to use rainwater from a
downstream agricultural irrigator with senior water rights to a
suburban rainwater harvester with junior or even no water rights.55
II. RAINWATER HARVESTING UNDER COLORADO'S PRIOR
APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
All the water was spoken for here in the Arkansas Basin
100 years ago or more. If the water falls as rain, that's
water that was going to get to the stream system, and
somebody already has dibs on it, and if somebody
intercepts that, it's the same as stealing
Kevin Lusk, Water Supply Engineer for Colorado Springs
Utilities56
51. See James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons
and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1.1 (2000).
52. See generally Bretsen & Hill, supra note 49, at 730-56.
5 3. Id.
54. See id. at 726-28.
55. See GRAYWATER SYSTEMS, supra note 27, at 2.
56. Rappold, supra note 8.
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Despite its benefits, rainwater harvesting is not legal since it is
limited by all states.57 Rainwater harvesting in Colorado is not legal,
as it is limited by preexisting water rights held by other water users.
As the Colorado Division of Water Resources notes, "in much of the
state, it is illegal to divert rainwater falling on your property
expressly for a certain use unless you have a very old water right or
during occasional periods when there is a surplus of water in a river
system. The preexisting water rights that affect rainwater
harvesting in Colorado arise under the prior appropriation doctrine. In
Colorado, as in other western states,5 9 ownership of water resources
is vested in the state. From its ratification in 1876 to the present, the
Colorado Constitution has declared that "[t]he water of every natural
stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the State of Colorado, is
hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the same is
dedicated to the use of the people of the State, subject to
appropriation as hereinafter provided."60 Colorado has explicitly
extended this constitutional declaration to rainwater and other forms
of precipitation. The Colorado Weather Modification Act of 1972
states:
The general assembly declares that the state of Colorado
claims the right to all moisture suspended in the
atmosphere which falls or is artificially induced to fall
within its borders. Said moisture is declared to be the
property of the people of this state, dedicated to their use
pursuant to sections 5 and 6 of article XVI of the Colorado
constitution and as otherwise provided by law.6 1
However, this ownership interest has not given states, or the public
in general, rights in water that are equivalent to public or private
property rights. Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Section
57. Daniel Findlay, Note, Rainwater Collection, Water Law, and Climate
Change: A Flood of Problems Waiting to Happen?, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE
ED. 74, 75. 85-87 (2009), http://www.ncjolt.org/sites/default/files/FindlayDan.pdf.
58. COLO. Div OF WATER RES., RAINWATER COLLECTION IN COLORADO 1,
http://water.state.co.us/DWRIPub/Documents/DWRRainwaterFlyer.pdf
59. See Rainwater Harvesting, supra note 36, at 226-27.
60. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
61. COLO. REv. STAT. § 36-20-103 (2010). By its terms, Colorado's Weather
Modification Act of 1972 is repealed effective July 1, 2011. § 36-20-127.
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5 of Article XVI of the Colorado Constitution "was primarily
intended to preserve the historical appropriation system of water
rights upon which the irrigation economy in Colorado was founded,
rather than to assure public access to waters for purposes other than
appropriation." 62 However, such declarations provide the legal
foundation for the state's regulatory role in the creation and transfer
of water rights. 63 In a state whose water law is based on the prior
appropriation doctrine,64 neither the molecules of water on or under
the land nor the rights to use such water belongs to the landowner as
part of his or her property right. 65 Instead, water rights are created
when a user diverts surface water for a beneficial use. 66 Seniority is
granted based on the concept of "first in time, first in right" so that
the first to appropriate a surface water source has a senior right to the
water against all subsequent or junior appropriators. 67 If a surface
water source becomes over-appropriated because it carries too little
water relative to all of the water rights, junior appropriators are
denied access to water based on the order of seniority.68 Surface
water is considered over-appropriated when "there is not enough
water in the streams [during irrigation season or at other times of the
year] to satisfy all of the decreed surface appropriations." 69 Although
water rights are not permanent, a holder's right continues unless he or
she abandons the right by failing to divert the water or by failing to
make beneficial use of it due to non-use or waste. 70 Every prior
appropriation state, except for Colorado, which has a system of
special water courts, has administrative agencies that grant water
rights, adjudicate abandonments, and approve transfers of water
62. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979).
63. See id at 1029.
64. VRANESH, supra note 4, at 8.
65. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Park Cnty. Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP., 45 P.3d 693,
707 (Colo. 2002).
66. Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Amity Mut. Irrigation Co., 688 P.2d 1110, 1112-13
(Colo. 1984). See generally COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102 (2010) (statutory
implementation of the prior appropriation doctrine).
67. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-47 (1882).
68. City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 555 (Colo. 1961). See
also A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric? 76 N.D. L.
REv. 881, 882 (2000).
69. Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329, 330 (Colo. 1973).
70. See People ex rel. Danielson v. City of Thornton, 775 P.2d 11, 14-15 (Colo.
1989).
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rights.7 ' The prior appropriation doctrine affects the ability of
property owners and building residents to harvest rain and other
forms of precipitation to protect the water rights of senior
appropriators, especially when surface water sources are already
over-appropriated.72 The majority of Colorado's streams are over-
appropriated, especially those on the eastern slope of the Rocky
Mountains, where most Coloradans live. 73 With over-appropriated
conditions arising as early as the 1890s on some streams, water rights
with priorities as old as 100 years can often be considered junior.74
Although rainwater that disappears into the ground or runs off into a
storm drainage system may appear to be wasted, in Colorado such
water is presumed to be tributary to a surface water source and
available to satisfy existing water rights, especially the water rights of
senior appropriators in an over-appropriated stream system.75 Due to
historical development patterns, agricultural irrigators in Colorado
tend to be senior appropriators, while residential rainwater harvesters
tend to be newer appropriators who intercept rain and use rainwater
for their domestic needs out of priority.7 6 Although some local
governments in other western states require rainwater harvesting,
71. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western
Water Law for Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 80
OR. L. REv. 861 (2001).
72. See BEAUJON, supra note 46.
73. Id. See also City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 71 n.66
(Colo. 1996) (noting that the South Platte River Basin is substantially over-
appropriated); Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 550
P.2d 288, 292 (Colo. 1976) (agreeing that the Cache La Poudre River is over-
appropriated except during flood stages); Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Shelton, 529 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Colo. 1974) (noting that the Arkansas River is
"greatly over-appropriated"); Matthew S. Pozanovic & Carmen S. Hall, Surface
Water Rights, in COLORADO WATER LAW BENCHBOOK 2-1, 2-6 (Carrie L. Ciliberto
& Timothy J. Flanagan eds., 1st ed. Supp. 2010).
74. Pozanovic & Hall, supra note 73, at 2-6.
75. See Ready Mixed Concrete Co. v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 115
P.3d 638, 643 (Colo. 2005) ("Colorado's prior appropriation law is 'first in time
first in right.' To allow junior appropriators to intercept with impunity return flows
of any type upon which senior appropriations depend would result in a 'last in time
first in right' doctrine."); R.J.A., Inc. v. Water Users Ass'n of Dist. No. 6, 690 P.2d
823, 826 (Colo. 1984) (noting that "seepage and percolation belong to the river,"
and "that it is presumed that all ground water finds its way to the stream in the
watershed in which it lies").
76. See generally VRANESH, supra note 4, at 5-7, 12-15.
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Colorado considered rainwater harvesting illegal prior to 2009 based
on a strict application of the prior appropriation doctrine.n Even
though Colorado had no law specifically prohibiting rainwater
harvesting, such harvesting was presumed to injure the water rights
of senior appropriators.78 A potential rainwater harvester could only
overcome this presumption by supplying the water court or the State
Engineer with hydrological evidence, which could be expensive to
develop, 79 or developing a plan of augmentation to replace 100% of
the rain captured out-of-priority.80 As residential homeowners in
Colorado discovered that rainwater harvesting was essentially illegal,
they began to complain to state legislators who crafted a political
solution that balanced the desires of rainwater harvesters with the
rights of senior appropriators.8 '
III. COLORADO'S RAINWATER HARVESTING STATUTES
"People are shocked that some developer or water provider
owns the water that falls out of the sky."
Colorado State Representative Marsha Looper.82
77. See Rainwater Harvesting, supra note 36, at 227-28; M. Becker, New
Tucson Regulations Require Graywater Use and Harvesting of Rainwater, 13 W.
WATER L. & POL'Y REP., 15, 16 (2008).
78. See BEAUJON, supra note 46.
7 9. Id.
80. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., AUTHORIZATION OF PILOT PROJECTS
FOR THE BENEFICIAL USE OF CAPTURED PRECIPITATION IN NEW REAL ESTATE
DEVELOPMENTS: CRITERIA AND GUIDELINES FOR THE "RAINWATER HARVESTING"
PILOT PROJECT PROGRAM (2010) , http://cwcbweblink.state.co.us/WebLink/
ElectronicFile.aspx?docid= 142162&searchid=c25573eb-fl b7-4b8c-98 10-
6dd02adee4e2&dbid=0 [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. A plan for augmentation is
a detailed program, which may be either temporary or perpetual in
duration, to increase the supply of water available for beneficial use in a
division or portion thereof by the development of new or alternate means
or points of diversion, by a pooling of water resources, by water exchange
projects, by providing substitute supplies of water, by the development of
new sources of water, or by any other appropriate means. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (2010).
81. See Rappold, supra note 8.
82. Paulson, supra note 7.
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"Every drop of water that hits the ground belongs to
someone."
Kevin Bommer, Lobbyist for the Colorado Municipal
League.83
In 2009, the Colorado General Assembly passed, and Governor
Bill Ritter signed, two bills that allow rainwater harvesting under
limited circumstances. 84 Senate Bill 09-080 authorizes small-scale
residential rainwater harvesting8 while House Bill 09-1129
authorizes larger, development-wide rainwater harvesting. 86  Both
statutes work within the confines of the prior appropriation doctrine
but point toward possible broader rainwater harvesting initiatives in
Colorado in the future.
A. Senate Bill 09-080
Senate Bill 09-080 amends Colorado's water code by authorizing
the State Engineer to issue a permit for a small-scale rainwater
harvesting system if certain criteria are met:
First, the system must collect precipitation from the roof of a
building that is primarily used as a residence.89
Second, the building must not be served by a domestic water
system that serves more than three single-family dwellings, even if
the building is not connected to that system.90 Thus, if the building
83. Id.
84. See Rappold, supra note 8.
85. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-105(1)(f), § 37-92-602(1)(g) (2010).
86. See § 37-60-115(6).
87. § 37-90-105(1). The statutory phrase for a rainwater harvesting system is a
"rooftop precipitation collection system." Id.
88. In addition to these statutory criteria, the board of any ground water
management district is authorized to adopt rules that further restrict the use of
rooftop precipitation collection systems. § 37-90-105(7) (2010).
89. § 37-90-105(1)(f)(I), § 37-92-602(l)(g)(I) (2010). A requirement in the
original bill limiting the size of the rooftop to 3,000 square feet was later
eliminated. S. B. 09-080, 1st Sess., at 1 (Colo. 2009), available at
http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2009a/csl.nsf/billcontainers/49D4349AC4A73
794872575370071F5D4/$FILE/080sagr 01.pdf.
90. § 37-90-105(l)(f)(I) (2010), § 37-92-602(l)(g)(I).
[VOL. XXII
RAINWA TER HAR VESTING
can be supplied by a municipality, water district, or other water
system, a rainwater harvesting system cannot be installed.
Third, the applicant must have a permit to use a small-capacity
well in a designated ground water basin or an exempt well elsewhere,
or be legally entitled to use such a well for the building served by the
rainwater harvesting system.91
Finally, the water collected can only be used for ordinary
household purposes, fire protection, domesticated animal watering, or
the irrigation of up to one acre of gardens and lawns. 92 However, the
limitations of use contained in the well/rainwater harvesting permit
trump the statutorily defined uses. 93 Thus, according to the Colorado
Division of Water Resources, if an existing small capacity well
permit is limited to household uses, the water from a rainwater
harvesting system is also limited to household uses and cannot be
used to water a small vegetable garden.94
The statute also authorizes the State Engineer or the division
engineers to issue implementing regulations. 95 If the statute or
regulations are violated, the State Engineer can seek an injunction
from the appropriate water court, and if the regulations are upheld,
the violator must pay court costs, including reasonable attorney
fees. 96 A violator must also pay a fine of $500 for each violation. 9 7
Thus, an unauthorized rainwater harvesting system, such as rain
barrels fed by a house gutter, could cost a homeowner $500 per rain
barrel and even more if the homeowner is obstinate and the use of the
rain barrel must be enjoined. The statute's provisions on fines and
enforcement confirm that rainwater harvesting, in the absence of a
statutory authorization, is illegal in Colorado because of Colorado's
relatively strict application of the prior appropriation doctrine.
B. House Bill 09-1129
House Bill 09-1129 amends Colorado's water code by authorizing
the Colorado Water Conservation Board, in consultation with the
91. § 37-90-105(1)(f)(II) (2010), § 37-92-602(1)(g)(III).
92. §§ 37-90-105(1)(f)(I)(A)-(D), §§ 37-90-602(1)(g)(I)(A)-(D).
93. § 37-90-105(7).
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State Engineer, to select up to ten new residential or mixed-use
developments as pilot projects to collect precipitation from rooftops
for non-potable uses. 9 8 The statutory goal of the ten-year pilot
program is to gather information on local precipitation, return flow
patterns, native plant consumption, and ground water flow, evaluate
rainwater harvesting system designs, "measure precipitation capture
efficiencies," and "quantify the amount of precipitation that must be
augmented to prevent injury to decreed rights." 99 The Colorado
Water Conservation Board has interpreted this goal to mean that the
pilot program "is to gain additional field-verified information about
the feasibility of rainwater harvesting as a water conservation
measure in Colorado, through pairing it directly with advanced
outdoor water demand management-particularly efficient
landscaping and irrigation practices."100 The ten pilot projects are
intended to represent a range of sizes, as well as different geographic
areas and hydrological conditions, with priority given to projects that
are in areas facing renewable water supply challenges and promote
water conservation.101 During the initial two-year data collection
period, each project must operate according to a substitute water
supply plan approved annually by the State Engineer which replaces
the water captured from rooftops and impermeable surfaces of the
development-wide rainwater harvesting system.102 After this initial
period, the pilot project may either apply to a water court for a
permanent augmentation plan or permanently retire the rainwater
harvesting system.10 3 In both the substitute water supply plan and the
permanent augmentation plan, the pilot project can reduce the amount
of replacement water by the amount of precipitation that would not
have entered a natural stream due to the historical consumptive use
by preexisting natural vegetation.104 The amount of net depletion
must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence for the permanent
plans of augmentation and by using the data collected through the
pilot project for the substitute water supply plans. 0 5
98. § 37-60-115(6)(a).
99. Id.
100. GUIDELINES, supra note 80.
101. §§ 37-60-115(6)(b)(III)-(V).






Prior to House Bill 09-1129, Colorado required that all rainwater
captured out-of-priority be replaced in the stream system in like time
and place.106 The concept of net depletion used in House Bill 09-
1129 reduces the amount of replacement water from 100% to a lesser
percentage. Requiring less than full replacement parallels similar
statutory exceptions for on-stream reservoir evaporation and gravel
pit pond evaporation. 07 Like House Bill 09-1129, these statutes
reduce the augmentation obligation by the amount of precipitation
that did not historically reach a stream system due to native plant
evapotranspiration. 10 For gravel pit ponds evaporation, the Colorado
Division of Water Resources generally accepts a credit for
evapotranspiration of seventy percent of the total precipitation for
non-irrigated sites under the assumption that seventy percent of the
precipitation did not return to a stream system due to the consumptive
use by native plants.' 0 9  Higher credits for evapotranspiration are
possible if supported by empirical data, and a recent study suggests
that higher credits may be possible based on evapotranspiration rates
ranging from 85% to 97% depending on drought conditions."l0
IV. TAKINGS OF WATER RIGHTS
Senate Bill 09-080 and House Bill 09-1129 moved quickly through
the Colorado General Assembly and received unanimous votes.
106. Carolyn F. Burr & James N. Noble, Rainwater Harvesting: A New Water
Supply Option in Colorado?, COLO. B. Ass'N 1 (2008), http://www.cobar.org/
repository/InsideBar/Water%2OLaw/October%209,%202008/Rainwater%2OHarv
esting%20Handout- 1 0-9-08.pdf.
107. See id at 2 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-84-117(5), § 37-80-120(5), § 37-
92-305(12) (2010)).
108. Id.
109. Id. The original bil for development-wide rainwater harvesting systems
incorporated the concept of a seventy percent evapotranspiration rate but it was
later removed. H. B. 09-1129, 67th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. 2 (Colo. 2009).
110. See DOUGLAS COUNTY WATER STUDY, supra note 37, at 1.
111. See COLO. ST. ASSEMB., Summarized History for Bill Number SBO9-080,
http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2009alcsl.nsf/fsbillcont3/49D4349AC4A7379
4872575370071F5D4?open&file=080_enr.pdf (follow "History" hyperlink) (last
visited Apr. 20, 2011) (Colo. S. Bill 09-080 was introduced in the Senate on
January 13, 2009 and was signed by the President of the Senate and Speaker of the
House on April 14, 2009); H. B. 09-1129, 67th Gen. Assemb., Ist Sess. 2 (Colo.
2009) (H.B. 09-1129 was introduced into the House of Representatives on January
2011] 175
176 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
The willingness of legislators to officially legalize rainwater
harvesting and the bills' contents point to the potential for even more
expansive rainwater harvesting legislation, especially since House
Bill 09-1129 is specifically designed to provide the empirical data to
justify further developments in rainwater harvesting and reduce the
amount of rainwater harvesting that is illegal.1 12
Except for a handful of development-wide pilot projects, rainwater
harvesting in Colorado is primarily confined to single houses or
small clusters of houses drawing water from small-capacity wells in
designated ground water basins or exempt wells outside designated
ground water basins.113 However, the demand for rainwater
harvesting is likely to increase as Colorado experiences continuing
population growth, a gap in identified water resources to meet this
growth, and climate change.1 14 Incredulous voters in the heavily
populated urban areas of the Front Range who want to harvest
rainwater but discover they cannot may place political pressure for
change on their state legislators. In response, future legislation could
expand the authorized scope of rainwater harvesting by allowing the
widespread use of rain barrels by residences in suburban areas
already served by municipal and other domestic water providers and
by increasing number of development-wide rainwater harvesting
systems. As the authorized scope of rainwater harvesting is enlarged,
the likelihood of affecting surface water flows and injuring the water
rights of senior appropriators protected by the constitutional doctrine
of prior appropriation also increases." 5 In addition to mounting
political opposition in the General Assembly, Colorado's ever
vigilant large water rights owners would seek to employ legal tools to
prevent injury to their senior water rights, such as via a takings
claim.116 Senate Bill 09-080 and House Bill 09-1129 and this
scenario of broader enabling legislation raises the issue of whether
13, 2009 and was signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate by May 18, 2009).
112. See BEAUJON, supra note 46, at 2.
113. See supra Part III.A.
114. See supra Part. I.
115. See id.
116. See, e.g., Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Simpson, 877 P.2d 335,
340 (Colo. 1994) (analyzing claims by senior appropriators asserting a takings in
connection with Senate Bill 120 that exempts preexisting sand and gravel




these statutes create a takings of senior water rights to satisfy the
demands of more junior users.
Under the United States and Colorado Constitutions, the
government cannot take private property for public uses unless just
compensation is paid to the property owner.1 17 Although the
relationship between takings jurisprudence and water rights has been
litigated in connection with activities such as dam building" and the
maintenance of instream flows to protect endangered species, 119 this
relationship has not been explored to date in connection with
rainwater harvesting. Since senior water rights are constitutionally
protected in Colorado through the prior appropriation doctrine,120
applying the takings doctrine to rainwater harvesting provides a
means of understanding the degree of protection water property rights
can receive under the prior appropriation doctrine and the extent to
which rainwater harvesting is possible vis-A-vis senior appropriative
water rights.
Analyzing both of these issues in the takings context requires
exploring several questions. First, does the senior water rights holder
have a private property right? Second, what is the public nature of
the new use of the property right? Third, if a property right exists
and the use is a public use, then how has the government impaired
this property right? The nature of the government action will govern
the legal standard used in determining if the government action
creates a taking.121 Finally, if a taking has occurred, how will the
compensation be measured?
A. Property Rights in Water in Colorado
The question of whether a senior appropriator holds a valid private
property right to water arises from the elusive and multifaceted nature
of water rights.122 Water rights are a unique form of property rights
for several reasons: the importance of water for survival; the scarcity
117. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; COLO. CONST. art. II, §
15.
118. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 728 (1950).
119. See Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 277 P.3d 1145, 1148 (Or.
2010).
120. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
122. See Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTING W.-Nw. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (2002).
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of fresh water; the common nature of water; the dynamic nature of
water due to its ability to move, be stored, evaporate, and reused; the
uncertain and variable nature of water due to droughts, floods, and
climate change; the historical development of water rights under the
prior appropriation doctrine; and the evolution of state water laws and
the limitations they place on water rights.123 Since neither the United
States Constitution nor the Colorado Constitution define the phrase
"private property," the private property rights that are protected from
a taking are created and defined by state law. 124 In Colorado, a water
right is characterized as a private property right.' 25 The Colorado
Constitution establishes the parameters of water property rights by
stating that "the right to divert the unappropriated waters of any
natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied." 26 This
language creates a constitutional right to appropriate water in
accordance with the allowances and limitations of the Colorado
Constitution.127 The constitutional right is implemented through the
Water Right Determination and Administration Act, which defines a
"water right" as "the right to use in accordance with its priority a
certain portion of the waters of the state by reason of the
appropriation of the same."1 2 8 Thus, according to the Colorado
Supreme Court, the property right recognized:
[A]s a Colorado water right is a right to use beneficially a
specified amount of water, from the available supply of
surface water or tributary groundwater, that can be
captured, possessed, and controlled in priority under a
123. See id.; John D. Leshy, A Conversation About Takings and Water Rights, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1987-89 (2005); Scott Andrew Shepard, The Unbearable Cost
of Skipping the Check: Property Rights, Takings Compensation & Ecological
Protection in the Western Water Law Context, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1063, 1116
(2009); Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59
ALA. L. REV. 679, 691-92 (2008).
124. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 123, at 701; see also Leshy, supra note
123, at 2003.
125. See Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 26 P.2d 313, 314 (Colo. 1981);
see also Gardner v. State, 614 P.2d 357, 360 (Colo. 1980).
126. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
127. See State ex rel. Danielson v. Vickroy, 627 P.2d 752, 757 (Colo. 1981).




decree, to the exclusion of all others not then in priority
under a decreed water right.129
Based on this language and how it has been construed by the
Colorado courts, the strength of a water property right depends on the
presence of unappropriated water, whether water is part of a "natural
stream," "a diversion of water, and an application of that water to a
beneficial use."' 30
Since "the constitutional right to appropriate [water] is limited to
unappropriated water,"13 1 a property right in water can only be
established if such water is available for diversion and beneficial
use. 132 Surface water is overappropriated when "there is not enough
water in the stream [at any given time] to satisfy all the decreed [ ]
appropriations," and, conversely, any excess water is considered
unappropriated if the needs of all the appropriators are met.' 33 Of
course, "the problem is determining, at any given time, just how
much water is available for appropriation" due to the absolute nature
of the constitutional right to appropriate unappropriated waters. 134
Other western states that have adopted the prior appropriation
doctrine have also adopted an administrative permit system in which
a vested water right is not created until an administrative body issues
a permit, which provides at least a potential check against over
appropriation.135 However, water rights subject to Colorado's Water
Right Determination and Adjudication Act vest upon the private act
of appropriation and not official adjudication due to Colorado's
constitutional language. 136 Historically, in response to this situation,
Colorado has taken a wait-and-see approach in which appropriators
129. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d. 46, 53
(Colo. 1999).
130. VRANESH, supra note 4, at 24-25, 32. See generally id.
131. VRANESH, supra note 4, at 27.
132. See Empire Lodge Homeowner's Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1147
(Colo. 2001).
133. Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329, 330 (1973). See VRANESH, supra note 4, at
27.
134. VRANESH, supra note 4, at 27.
135. See id. at 32.
136. See Shirola v. Turkey Cafion Ranch, L.L.C., 937 P.2d 739, 744 (Colo.
1997). Even though a decree from a water court is not necessary to create the right,
adjudication is important in Colorado since a decreed water right is necessary to
"establish[ ] a priority date that can be enforced against other users." Id.
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would make their appropriations from a surface water source and if
there was not sufficient water available, then "senior appropriators
could protect their rights by 'calling the river,' and the state engineer
would shut the junior appropriators' headgates."13 7 As a result of this
approach, the Colorado Division of Water Resources considers most
stream systems over-appropriated.138
The constitutional right to appropriate is also limited to the waters
of "any natural stream." 39 According to the Colorado Supreme
Court, these words "were intended to be used in their broadest scope"
so that intermittent streams and water that are tributary to a natural
stream are included within the constitutional language.14 0 All flowing
water, whether from a spring, an underground stream, or via
percolation or seepage, as well as all ground water, is presumed to be
tributary to a natural stream, and the burden of overcoming the
presumption by clear and satisfactory evidence is on the individual
asserting that the water in question is not tributary to a natural stream
to prove that fact by clear and satisfactory evidence.' 4 1
Finally, a valid appropriation of water must meet two
requirements: "a diversion of water, and an application of that water
for a beneficial use." 42 A "diversion" is statutorily defined as
"removing water from its natural course or location or controlling
water in its natural course or location, by means of a control
structure, ditch, canal, flume, reservoir, bypass, pipeline, conduit,
well, pump, or other structure or device."l43 Generally, Colorado
courts require an "actual diversion of a definite quantity of water" to
make an effective appropriation. 144 However, a diversion may not be
an absolute requirement due to the Colorado Supreme Court's
holding in the context of instream flows that Section 5 of Article XVI
137. VRANESH, supra note 4, at 27.
138. See Rainwater Collection in Colorado, supra note 58. See also supra note
73 and accompanying text.
139. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; COLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(13) (2010).
140. In re German Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo. 1913).
141. Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951).
142. VRANESH, supra note 4, at 32. An intent to divert is also a requirement in
some cases, but a diversion and application to a beneficial use alone are sufficient
to create an appropriation. Id.
143. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(7) (2010).




of the Colorado Constitution did not create a constitutional
requirement for an appropriation to involve a diversion.'4 5
In contrast, the beneficial use requirement is an absolute
requirement based on both constitutional and statutory language.14 6
Although the Colorado Constitution does not define the phrase
"beneficial use," Colorado courts have interpreted the term broadly to
include the Colorado Constitution's priorities of use during water
shortages - domestic, agricultural, manufacturing, and mining - as
well as power generation, aquaculture, recreation, irrigation of trees
and grass in municipalities, and instream flows.147 The statutory
definition of the phrase "beneficial use" in the Water Right
Determination Act affirms the broad interpretation by not limiting the
range of uses.148  The concept of beneficial use both creates and
limits the property right in water. Beneficial use "becomes the basis,
measure, and limit of the appropriation"1 49 and is encompassed in the
idea of the duty of water. "Duty of water draws a distinction between
the maximum rate of diversion and the total amount of water that
may be diverted. The former is controlled by the decree, while the
latter is determined by the reasonable needs of the purpose for which
145. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594
P.2d 570, 572-76 (Colo. 1979) (noting that instream flows by definition do not
involve diversions).
146. See supra note 129-32 and accompanying text.
147. VRANESH, supra note 4, at 44-45.
148. Id. at 44. As defined by the statute,
'beneficial use' is the use of that amount of water that is reasonable and
appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without
waste the purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made and,
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes the impoundment
of water for recreational purposes, including fishery or wildlife, and also
includes the diversion of water by a county, municipality, city and county,
water district, water and sanitation district, water conservation district, or
water conservancy district for recreational in-channel diversion purposes.
For the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations,
'beneficial use' shall also include the appropriation by the state of
Colorado in the manner prescribed by law of such minimum flows
between specific points or levels for and on natural streams and lakes as
are required to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.
COLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2010).
149. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n. v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53
(1999).
20 11] 18 1
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the decree was entered." 5 0 Although the water rights of senior
appropriators exist and are strengthened by continuous diversions of
tributary water and applications of that water to a beneficial use,
those water rights are ultimately limited in scope by historical use
and return flows.' 5 ' Unused or waste water returns to the stream
system and becomes available for use by other appropriators,
especially junior appropriators.1 52
Assuming the constitutional elements of a diversion for beneficial
use from a natural stream of unappropriated waters are satisfied, the
private property right created is a usufructuary right which gives the
appropriator the right to use water that is owned by the state without
impairing its substance.153 The property right created is not an
ownership right to molecules of water, but a right to divert a specified
quantity of water for a specified "beneficial use with a specific
priority relative to other users from the same source."1 54 The exact
nature of the property right in water relative to common categories of
property is somewhat confusing based on the various
characterizations given by the Colorado courts over time:
Water rights have been characterized as a freehold, Gutheil
Park Inv. Co. v. Montclair, 32 Colo. 420, 76 P. 1050
(1904); Grand Valley Irrigation Co. v. Lesher, 28 Colo.
273, 65 P. 44 (1901), see also Comstock v. Olney Springs
Drainage Dist., 97 Colo. 416, 50 P.2d 531 (1935); Davis v.
Randall, 44 Colo. 488, 99 P. 322 (1908); Monte Vista
Canal Co. v. Centennial Irrigating Ditch Co., 22 Colo.
App. 364, 123 P. 831 (1912); as an interest in real estate,
West End Irrigation Co. v. Garvey, 117 Colo. 109, 184
P.2d 476 (1947); Talcott v. Mastin, 20 Colo. App. 488, 79
P. 973 (1905); as a property right lacking the dignity of an
estate in fee, Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 279 P.2d 420 (1955); as personal
property, Brighton Ditch Co. v. Englewood, 124 Colo. 366,
237 P.2d 116 (1951); and, perhaps most accurately, as a
"usufructuary" right, Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., supra;
150. VRANESH, supra note 4, at 46.
151. See id. at 46-47.
152. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo. 1982).
153. See id.
154. VRANESH, supra note 4, at 229.
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see also Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irrigation Co., 10 Colo.
582, 17 P. 487 (1887); Monte Vista Canal Co. v.
Centennial Irrigating Ditch Co., supra.15
The water use right is most often treated as a real property interest
in Colorado.1 56 By law, "in the conveyance of water rights in all
cases, except where the ownership of stock in ditch companies or
other companies constitutes the ownership of a water right, the same
formalities shall be observed and complied with as in the conveyance
of real estate."157 Water rights are also deemed real property in the
face of adverse possession claims.' 58
The value of this property right can be found in its priority to use a
certain amount of water from a certain diversion point in a stream
system.159 The owner of a decreed water right in a surface water
source can enforce the priority among the hierarchy of users in the
same stream system.160 "More specifically, it would allow a water
rights owner to make an enforceable 'call' to the Office of State
Engineer to shut down water to undecreed and junior water right
owners in favor of supplying the senior water owner's needs."'61
Since a water right under the prior appropriation doctrine is not a
fixed, tangible amount of water, but a right to use water, the chief
value of a water right is in its priority and the expectations created by
that priority. 162 Thus, priority "is the most valuable stick in the
155. Navajo Dev. Co., 655 P.2d at 1377.
156. Mari W. Deminski, Water Rights: Real Property, in COLORADO WATER
LAW BENCHBOOK § 7.2.3 (Carrie L. Ciliberto & Timothy J. Flanagan eds., 1st ed.
Supp. 2010).
157. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30-102(2) (2010).
158. Bagwell v. V-Heart Ranch, Inc., 690 P.2d 1271. 1273 (Colo. 1984).
159. See Navajo Dev. Co., 655 P.2d at 1377; see also Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr.,
Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32 ENVTL. L. 37, 42 (2002).
160. Navajo Dev. Co., 655 P.2d at 1377.
161. Demski, supra note 156, at § 7.2.5. However, both Professor Tarlock and
Justice Hobbs note that such enforcement of priorities may be more of a theoretical
exercise than an actual practice. See Tarlock, supra note 68, at 883; Hobbs, supra
note 159, at 43.
162. See Navajo Dev. Co., 655 P.2d at 1378, 1380.
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bundle"' 63 and to "deprive a person of his priority is to deprive him
of a most valuable property right."' 6 4
Even critics of the role of priority in the prior appropriation
doctrine note that priority should not be abandoned since there are no
superior alternatives to its role in protecting investment-backed
expectations.165 Colorado statutes and case law clearly demonstrate
that junior appropriators may not injure the water rights of senior
appropriators. The Water Right Determination and Appropriation Act
states that "water rights and uses vested prior to June 7, 1969, in any
person by virtue of previous or existing laws, including appropriation
from a well, shall be protected subject to the provisions of this
article"' 66 and emphasizes that "no reduction of any lawful diversion
because of the operation of the priority system shall be permitted
unless such reduction would increase the amount of water available
to and required by water rights having senior priorities."l'67
Generally, an injury to a water right arises from an action "that
causes or may cause the holders of decreed water rights to suffer loss
of water in the time, place, and amount they are entitled to use the
water."l68 As a result, "a junior appropriator may not divert the water
to which he is entitled by any method or means the result of which
will be to diminish or interfere with the right of a senior appropriator
to [the] full use of his appropriation."' 69 However, despite the
163. Hobbs, Jr., supra note 159, at 43.
164. Navajo Dev. Co., 655 P.2d at 1378 (quoting Nichols v. McIntosh, 34 P. 278,
280 (Colo. 1893)).
165. Tarlock, supra note 68, at 884. Professor Tarlock points out that priority is a
cause of environmental degradation, leads to inefficient use practices, and that the
transaction and interpersonal costs of enforcing priorities are high. Id. at 887, 898
& 901. Although Professor Tarlock states that priority is less important due to the
eras of federal reclamation projects and environmental management, he notes that
priority is still important today to support small, direct flow irrigation communities
in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah. See id. at 892-95.
166. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(2)(a) (2010). See § 37-82-104 (stating that
water rights of senior appropriators cannot be injured by appropriations from
natural springs).
167. § 37-92-102(2)(d) (2010).
168. Deminski, supra note 156, at 7-12 (quoting GREGORY J. HOBBS, JR.,
CITIZEN's GUIDE TO COLORADO WATER LAW 7 (3d ed. 2009)).
169. City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo. 1961). See also
Well Augmentation Subdistrict v. City of Aurora, 221 P.3d 399, 415 (Colo 2009)
("Colorado law absolutely protects senior rights from injury by junior rights and
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Colorado Supreme Court's use of the phrase "full use" to refer to
what is protected, senior water rights are not protected from any
injury but only from a material injury.170 Whether an injury rises to a
material one is an issue of fact rather than law.' 7 '
1. Property Rights and the Current Rainwater Harvesting Statutes
Both Senate Bill 09-080 and House Bill 09-1129 were carefully
drafted to accommodate the interests of constituents who wanted to
harvest rainwater without impinging on the vested water rights of
senior appropriators.' 72 To achieve this legislative tightrope act, both
statutes work within the confines of the prior appropriation doctrine.
As a result, existing property rights in water are not materially
injured, and neither statute gives rise to a takings claim.
To address the problem of out-of-priority diversions under the prior
appropriation doctrine, Senate Bill 09-080 integrates small-scale
residential rainwater harvesting into Colorado's existing statutory and
regulatory framework for ground water. 173 In Colorado, the
administration of a "water right depends upon the category of waters
to which the use right attaches." 74 The Colorado Constitution
establishes that the prior appropriation doctrine applies to water
rights in water from natural streams.17 5 This constitutional right is
implemented through the Water Right Determination and
mandates that augmentation plan applicants replace 100% of their out-of-priority
depletions.").
170. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-502(2)(a) (2010).
171. Buffalo Park Dev. Co. v. Mountain Mut. Reservoir Co., 195 P.3d 674, 684-
85 (Colo. 2008).
172. See Kirk Johnson, It's Now Legal to Catch a Raindrop in Colorado, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2009, at Al. In addition to the limited scope of the statutes, they
are both limited in reach. Colo. H. Bill 09-1129 by its terms only applies to ten
development-wide projects. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-60-115(6)(a) (2010). Colo.
S. Bill 09-080 is predicted to affect 250,000 people statewide. See Johnson, supra
at Al. However, this latter figure, while large, is less than 5% of Colorado's 2010
population of over 5,000,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
AND CHANGE: 2000-2010, U.S. CENSUS BRIEF 2, available at
http://2010.census.gov/2010census/datal (follow "Population Distribution and
Change" hyperlink).
173. See supra Part III.A.
174. Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993 P.2d
1177, 1181-82 (Colo. 2000).
175. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
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Administration Act of 1969 by Colorado's system of water courts and
administrative agencies such as the Colorado Division of Water
Resources, which includes the office of the State Engineer.' 76
While this constitutional right to appropriate water includes both
surface and ground water that is tributary to a natural stream, it does
not include nontributary ground water,' 77 which is further subdivided
into designated ground water,17 8 nontributary ground water, 17 9 and
not nontributary ground water. 180 The rationale for excluding
nontributary ground water is that its use "has a de minimus effect on
any surface stream."' 8 1 Since nontributary ground water is by
definition outside the scope of Article XVI, Section 6 of the Colorado
Constitution, the Colorado General Assembly has plenary authority
over the allocation and administration of this type of water.182 This
authority is also exercised through administrative agencies such as
the Colorado Division of Water Resources, which includes the
Colorado Ground Water Commission. Under its plenary authority,
the General Assembly has enacted the Colorado Ground Water
Management Act,1 84  which implements a modified prior
appropriation system, especially for designated ground water, to
"permit the full economic development of ground water resources,"
to protect prior appropriations of ground water, and to protect and
maintain reasonable rather than historic ground water pumping
levels. Senate Bill 09-080 takes advantage of the bifurcation in
Colorado water law between tributary surface and ground water and
nontributary ground water in several ways to avoid the problem of
176. See State ex rel. Danielson v. Vickroy, 627 P.2d 752,757 (Colo. 1981). See
generally COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101-106 (2010).




181. Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993 P.2d
1177, 1182 (Colo. 2000). See Kuiper v. Lundvall, 529 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Colo.
1974) (holding that ground water that takes more than one hundred years to reach a
natural stream is not a part of the surface stream and thus is not subject to the prior
appropriation provisions of the Colorado Constitution).
182. Black Squirrel Creek, 993 P.2d at 1182.
183. Gregory Hobbs, An Overview of Colorado Groundwater Law, COLO.
WATER (Colo. State Univ. Fort Collins, Colo.), Oct./Nov. 2007, at 4.
184. Id.
185. Black Squirrel Creek, 993 P.2d at 1183-84.
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out-of-priority diversions. First, the rainwater harvesting systems
permitted by Senate Bill 09-080 are specifically exempted from the
Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969.186 With
this exemption, rainwater harvesting systems are excluded from the
strict application of the prior appropriation doctrine mandated by the
Colorado Constitution.187 This priority system would tend to classify
rainwater harvesters as junior appropriators and make their use of
rainwater subject to the claims of senior appropriators.
Instead, rainwater harvesting becomes subject to an administrative
permitting system tied to small capacity 8 wells in designated ground
water basins and exempt wells elsewhere.' 89 The statutory link to
designated ground water basins reinforces the substitution of the
priority system mandated by the Colorado Constitution with a
modified prior appropriation system.190 "Within the geographic
boundaries of a designated [ground water] basin," all ground water is
presumed to be designated ground water, which is defined as ground
water which is not required for the fulfillment of surface water rights
and "has no more than a de minimus impact" on surface stream
flows.191 This presumption is not an absolute one, but "the burden of
proving that ground water within a designated basin is not designated
ground water is on the proponent of that proposition," usually a water
186. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-602(1)(g) (2010).
187. See § 37-92-102(1)(a).
188. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
189. See § 37-92-105(1); see also § 37-90-602(g) (2010); Rainwater Collection
in Colorado, supra note 58.
190. Black Squirrel Creek, 993 P.2d at 1184. The Colorado Ground Water
Commission has established eight designated ground water basins located on the
plains in eastern Colorado, well away from the urbanized areas of the Front Range
and the relatively moisture rich areas of the Western Slope. Id. See generally
COLORADO GROUND WATER COMMISSION, http://water.state.co.us/groundwater/
CGWC/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); Colorado Precipitation
Map, WORLDATLAS, http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/namerical
usstates/weathermaps/coprecip.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
191. Gallegos v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 147 P.3d 20, 21, 29 (Colo.
2006). See § 37-90-103(6)(a) (defining designated ground water). However, as
Gallegos demonstrates, surface water rights can exist in a designated ground water
basin and some of these surface rights can have priorities granted under the prior
appropriation doctrine that are senior to designated ground water rights. William H.
Fronczak, Designated Basin Ground Water: A Historical and Practical
Perspective, in COLORADO WATER LAW BENCHBOOK 4-14 (Carrie L. Ciliberto &
Timothy J. Flanagan eds., 1st. ed. Supp. 2010).
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rights holder claiming seniority under the Colorado Constitution's
prior appropriation doctrine' 92 Satisfying this burden of proof
requires costly hydrological studies to develop the necessary factual
data, which tends to discourage claims from even being initiated.' 93
Second, the statutory link in Senate Bill 09-080 to small capacity
wells in designated ground water basins and exempt wells elsewhere,
provides rainwater harvesters with further protection from senior
appropriators holding vested water rights under the Colorado
Constitution's prior appropriation doctrine. Generally, small capacity
and exempt wells are restricted to flow rates ranging from fifteen to
fifty gallons per minute and can only be used by single-family
residences for typical household uses and lawn irrigation, by a single
commercial business for drinking and sanitary water, or for watering
livestock and fire protection. 194 For exempt wells, the issuance of a
permit indicates an administrative judgment that pumping from the
well will not cause material injury to existing water rights. 195 in
designated ground water basins, the standard for granting permits for
wells generally requires the Colorado Ground Water Commission to
determine that designated ground water is available for appropriation
by a new junior well and that new the appropriation "will not
unreasonably impair existing water rights from the same source and
will not create unreasonable waste."' 96 If the junior well owner
demonstrates compliance with permit conditions, applicable
regulations, and conservation measures, the junior well is entitled to a
presumption of reasonable, rather than injurious, use of designated
ground water, and the burden of proving "unreasonable injury" is on
the owner of the senior water right.197 Small capacity well permits in
designated ground water basins are issued by the State Engineer
rather than the Colorado Ground Water Commission under different
statutory provisions.'9 8 Under these different provisions, the material
192. Gallegos, 147 P.2d at 32. Accord State ex rel. Danielson v. Vickroy, 627
P.2d 752, 759 (Colo. 1981).
193. See § 37-90-106(1)(a).
194. See §§ 37-90-105(1)(a)-(e), §§ 37-92-602(1)(b)-(f).
195. § 37-92-602(6). See also § 602(3)(b)(I)); Susan M. Curtis, Ground Water, in
COLORADO WATER LAW BENCHBOOK 3-9 (Carrie L. Ciliberto & Timothy J.
Flanagan eds., 1st. ed. Supp. 2010).
196. § 37-90-107(3) (2010). Accord Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water
Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993 P.2d 1177, 1189 (Colo. 2000). See § 37-90-111(1)(b).
197. Black Squirrel Creek, 993 P.2d at 1189-90.
198. See § 37-90-105(1).
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injury standard rather than the unreasonable impairment standard
seems to apply. 199  Whichever standard applies, a rainwater
harvesting system that meets the requirements for an exempt or small
capacity well permit should enjoy the same presumption that its
activities will not injure the water rights of senior appropriators.
House Bill 09-1129 has different goals than Senate Bill 09-080. As
a result, House Bill 09-1129 uses a different approach to work within
the confines of the prior appropriation doctrine and avoid creating a
takings claim. Through use of substitute water supply plans and plans
of augmentation, House Bill 09-1129 avoids the problem of out-of-
priority claims by senior appropriators by replacing the amount, time,
and place of the rainwater lost to harvesting activities.200 Even though
the replacement rate is less than 100%, all of the actual depletions to
a stream system are replaced due to the concept of net depletions tied
to native plant evapotranspiration rates.201 Thus, the prior use of
rainwater by a pilot project as a junior appropriator should not injure
the water rights of senior appropriators that vested under the prior
appropriation doctrine. As the Colorado Supreme Court has noted,
"water is available for appropriation if the taking thereof does not
cause injury." 202
2. Property Rights and Future Rainwater Harvesting Legislation
While Senate Bill 09-080 and House Bill 09-1129 were carefully
crafted to avoid a taking, the Colorado General Assembly will need
to consider the takings issue before enacting broader enabling
legislation. An expanded regime of rainwater harvesting could
include widespread use of rain barrels in suburban residences already
served by municipal water providers or retrofitting building and
developments in urban areas with collection systems that capture
199. § 37-90-105(3)(c) (material injury standard established for evaluating small
capacity well permits in subdivisions without a water supply plan recommended for
approval by the State Engineer). See also DICK WOLFE, COLO. DIV. OF WATER
RES., SYNOPSIS OF COLORADO WATER LAW 24 (2010), http://water.state.co.us/
DWRIPub/DWR%2OGeneral%2ODocuments/SynopsisOfCOWaterLaw.pdf.
200. See § 37-60-115(6)(c).
201. See § 37-60-115(6)(c)(II).
202. Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 550 P.2d
288, 294 (Colo. 1976) (finding that a plan of augmentation does not have to
replace 100% of the water when only 25% of the water returned to the stream after
use).
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rainwater instead of allowing it to runoff into storm drains and stream
systems. Imposing a regimen of net depletions or requiring
replacement water via plans of augmentation make rainwater
203harvesting more complicated. However, if such requirements are
not imposed, then increased rainwater harvesting would begin to alter
and diminish surface water flows. This state of affairs would bring
the rainwater harvester into conflict with the water rights owner with
the strongest property rights under Colorado's prior appropriation
doctrine - an appropriator with a final decree from a water court for a
diversion from a surface water source with a priority dating from the
mid to late nineteenth century.204 For example, the rebuttable
presumption under the Colorado Constitution and the Water Right
Determination and Adjudication Act that water is part of "any natural
stream"205 would begin to work against any broader legislation. As
the places where rainwater can be collected become more
widespread, the collected rainwater will be presumed to be part of the
waters that are subject to the prior appropriation doctrine. Since in
most of Colorado these waters are part of stream systems that are
already over-appropriated, legislation liberalizing rainwater
harvesting risks authorizing activity that materially injures
constitutionally and statutorily protected senior water rights
associated with surface water sources.206 Unlike the designated
ground water used in Senate Bill 09-080, which, by definition is
outside the scope of the prior appropriation doctrine and subject to
the plenary authority of the Colorado General Assembly because it is
nontributary, surface water sources are squarely within the prior
appropriation doctrine and the protections it provides to senior water
rights.207 Although valid governmental power to regulate a property
right, such as the power represented by the Ground Water
203. Senate Bill 120 provides precedent for authorizing an activity that affects
surface water rights without requiring a plan of augmentation. See § 37-90-137(11)
(exempting preexisting sand and gravel operations from permitting and
augmentation requirements despite tributary ground water lost to evaporation due
to excavations).
204. Laws Inconsistent in their Support ofRainwater Harvesting, Y1 ARIZ.
WATER RES. 1 (2008), available at http://ag.arizona.edu/azwater/awr/septoct08/
d3e789d0-7f00-0 101 -0097-9f670a768b94.html.
205. See supra notes 126-28.
206. See generally Rainwater Collection in Colorado, supra note 58.
207. See Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993
P.2d 1177, 1182 (Colo. 2000).
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Management Act, weakens the strength of that property right for
takings purposes, constitutional protection for a property right has the
opposite effect.
The senior water rights owner asserting a takings in response to
expanded legislation has the burden to prove that he or she holds a
valid property right to water, such as proving that it originally
diverted unappropriated waters of a natural stream and demonstrating
the extent of its historical beneficial use and the absence of waste or
an abandonment.208 However, once proven, the decree would
establish the priority of its real property right to use a certain amount
of water. 20 9 As a junior appropriator, a rainwater harvester is using
the water out of priority, and, if the stream system is over
appropriated, using water in a way that could materially injure the
water rights of senior appropriators. Thus, future legislation that
increases the scope of rainwater harvesting beyond the confines of
Senate Bill 09-080 and House Bill 09-1129 has the potential for
creating a valid takings claim by senior water rights owners absent
the incorporation of concepts such as net depletion and replacement
water.
B. Public Use
The United States Constitution contains an absolute requirement
that a taking be for a public use. 210 The Colorado Constitution states
that "private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or
private use, without just compensation." 211  The Colorado
Constitution further addresses the condemnation of private rights,
stating that "private property shall not be taken for private use unless
by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and
except for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or across the lands
of others, for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or sanitary
purposes."2 12 Since a rainwater harvesting system cannot be
characterized as a reservoir, drain, flume, or ditch across the land of
others without stretching the ordinary meaning of those words,
broader rainwater harvesting via legislation that extends beyond the
208. See Gray, supra note 122, at 12; see also § 37-92-304(6).
209. See §§ 37-92-304(6)-(7).
210. U.S. CONST.. amend. V.
211. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15.
212. Id. at § 14.
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confines of Senate Bill 09-080 and House Bill 09-1129 cannot be
justified as a private use taking under the Colorado Constitution. A
taking that is not for a public use is unconstitutional and cannot be
cured by the payment of just compensation. 2 13
According to Justice Chase's seriatim opinion in Calder v. Bull, 2 14
property taken by the state from one private individual that is then
transferred to another private individual is not for the "common
good."
An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary
to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. The
obligation of a law in governments established on express
compact, and on republican principles, must be determined
by the nature of the power, on which it is founded. A few
instances will suffice to explain what I mean. A law that
takes ... property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all
reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with
such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that
they have done it. 215
Despite this early concern about public takings for private use, the
United States Supreme Court's decisions on the public use
requirement of the Takings Clause clearly allow transfers from
citizen A to citizen B as long as the government has identified a
public purpose.216 Under the United States Constitution, public
purposes are ultimately as broad as the government's police power to
regulate for the health, safety, and general welfare of its citizens.217
213. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
214. 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
215. Id. at 388.
216. See generally Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469 (holding that city's exercise of eminent
domain for an economic development plan satisfied the public use requirement);
Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (stating that Act which
created land condemnation scheme to reduce concentration of land ownership was
not unconstitutional when granted power to condemn for public use); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (noting that once public purpose is found, the amount
and character of land to take is under the discretion of the legislative branch).
217. See Hawaii Housing Auth., 467 U.S. at 240. In Colorado, the property
owner has the burden of proving that the taking is not for a public purpose. Pub.
Serv. Co. v. Shaklee, 784 P.2d 314, 315 (Colo. 1989).
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The Colorado Constitution and Colorado statutes describe public uses
for which water may be diverted and appropriated and from which
water rights can be created; these uses constitute "public uses"
because they are beneficial uses. 218 Furthermore, the language of the
Colorado Constitution setting forth priorities among beneficial uses
in times of drought prefers water rights for domestic purposes over
all other purposes, including agricultural purposes, implying that this
private use has a public purpose.219 Although Colorado does not have
a statute conferring the right to condemn water, Colorado implicitly
recognizes an individual right to condemn water rights in connection
with the preferences established in the Colorado Constitution.220 A
junior appropriator can condemn the water rights of a senior
appropriator as long as the junior appropriator's use is higher or equal
to the senior appropriator's use in the constitutional order of
preferences, and compensation is paid for the taking. 221 However, the
Colorado courts' interpretation is not a bright-line preference for
using water for domestic purposes over using water for agricultural
purposes in proceedings to condemn water rights. 222  Thus, the
domestic and other uses of captured rainwater have a public purpose,
but they do not have a constitutional preference over the agricultural
uses by the downstream senior appropriators who might claim a
taking.
State constitutional and statutory declarations concerning the
public ownership of water and doctrines associated with public
ownership, such as the statutory public interest standard and the
218. See supra note 147-48 and accompanying text.
219. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6
("Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between those
using water for the same purpose; but when the waters of any natural
stream are not sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the
same, those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the
preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the
water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the
same for manufacturing purposes.")
220. See VRANESH, supra note 4, at 572-74.
221. See Black v. Taylor, 264 P.2d 502, 506 (Colo. 1953).
222. See Armstrong v. Larimer Cnty. Ditch Co., 27 P. 235 (Colo. App. 1891);
Black v. Taylor, 264 P.2d 502 (Colo. 1953); Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch
Extension Co., 94 P. 339 (Colo. 1908); Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch
Co., 48 P. 532 (Colo. 1896); VRANESH, supra note 4, at 572-74 (citing Strickler v.
City of Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313 (Colo. 1891).
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judicially created public trust doctrine, also support the proposition
that reductions in a senior appropriator's water rights can serve a
public purpose. Fourteen of the seventeen western states require state
administrative agencies to consider the public interest (or public
welfare) when evaluating new water right applicationS223 and a
number of states apply the public interest standard to water transfers
and other changes in water rights.224 Originally, the public interest
concept protected the property rights of downstream users or junior
appropriators.225 However, the concept is now interpreted broadly as
an affirmative duty to "secure the greatest possible benefit from [the
public waters] for the public," 226 such as through the preservation of
aesthetic and environmental values. 227 Similarly, under the judicially-
created public trust doctrine, the government is a trustee of a broadly
conceived public interest in water as a public resource. 228 The public
trust becomes an affirmative standard imposed on state legislatures
and administrative agencies to use their police powers, either on their
own initiative or when directed by a court in response to litigation
initiated by exclusion rights holders, to protect this public interest
against the private property rights of use-holders. 229 As described by
the California Supreme Court "the state as sovereign retains
continuing supervisory control over its navigable waters and the
lands beneath those waters[, which] . . . prevents any party from
acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to
the interests protected by the public trust."230 This continuing power
223. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 45-153 (LexisNexis 2008); CAL. WATER CODE §
1255 (West 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-203A(5)(e) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
82a-711 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-234 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
533.370(5) (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-7 (2008); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 61-04-06(4) (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.170(6) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 46-2A-9 (2008); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134(b)(3)(C) (West 2007);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(1)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
90.03.290(1) (West 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503 (2009).
224. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-222(1) (2010); N.M. STAT. ANN § 72-5-
23 (LexisNexis 2010); Bonham v. Moran, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
225. See Bretsen & Hill, supra note 49, at 743-45.
226. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910).
227. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 448 n. 2 (Idaho 1985).
228. See James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths: A History of the
Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 97 (2007).
229. See id. at 96-97.




"extends to the revocation of previously granted rights or to the
enforcement of the trust against lands long thought free of the trust,"
such as Los Angeles' rights to divert water from Mono Lake for
municipal needs pursuant to its water rights and a state permit. 23 1 h
balancing competing interests, the California Supreme Court stated
that "all uses of water, including public trust uses, must now conform
to the standard of reasonable use."232 Legal scholars, perhaps more so
than courts, have used concepts, such as the public trust and
reasonable use, to justify altering the water rights of the most senior
appropriators, protecting endangered species, and improving water
quality without creating an unconstitutional taking.233 In states that
have adopted the public trust doctrine, "there is no taking of private
property where the governmental interference imposes no greater
limitations than does the public trust" because the public trust defines
234the limits of private property rights. In essence, the public trust
doctrine and similar public interest standards can eliminate or
downgrade existing beneficial uses of water and create new
beneficial uses (with higher priorities or preferences), even if the
result is to undermine longstanding vested water rights. 235 Since the
public trust doctrine is dynamic and the nature and extent of what it
protects changes with public policy, vested water rights will also be
in flux because of the broad power of government to regulate water
rights as needed to further the values represented by the public trust.
However, the public trust doctrine has limits. The United States
Supreme Court "has cautioned that, while the law that governs
private property may change over time, the takings clause imposes
limits on the state's power to redefine property rights."2 36 Thus, the
Court declared that "a State by ipse dixit, may not transform a private
property [right] into public property without compensation .... This
is the very kind of thing that the Takings Clause ... was meant to
231. Id. at 723.
232. Id. at 725.
233. See generally Leshy, supra note 123.
234. James H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental Interference with the Use
of Water: When Do Unconstitutional Takings Occur?, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
1, 55 (2005). See Shepard, supra note 123, at 1072.
235. See Gray, supra note 122, at 9-10; Leshy, supra note 123, at 1997-99.
236. Gray, supra note 122, at 14.
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prevent." 237  The tension between private and public rights is
especially evident with water rights. Specifically:
The application of the reasonable use and public trust
doctrines to limit the exercise of water rights for the benefit
of endangered species and other environmental uses thus
presents its own takings question: When the government
restricts the impoundment or diversion of water to prevent
unreasonable use or to protect the public trust, is it simply
asserting a public servitude (or some other type of
limitation) that inheres in the water right, or is it effectively
changing the definition of the property right in water to
impose a new limitation on the exercise of that right.?238
If no normative definition of property rights can be applied to
water rights, then the nature of the interests in water will be as fluid
as water itself and not be protected by the constitutional limitation on
takings.23 9
237. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980).
238. Gray, supra note 122, at 14. See also Shepard, supra note 123, at 1094-96.
A legal scholar has noted that "the individual-centered 'bundle of sticks' analogy is
difficult to apply to water rights because the property right in water is unique,
stemming from water's singular ability to sustain life and nature as a common
resource." Ling-Yee Huang, Fifth Amendment Takings & Transitions in Water
Law: Compensation (Just) for the Environment, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 49,
54 (2007).
239. At least two other legal scholars would redefine the nature of property rights
in water by redefining the nature of property rights. See generally Zellmer &
Harder, supra note 123. Instead of using the traditional "bundle of rights
metaphor," property rights would be envisioned as a "web of interests." Id. at 684.
In the case of water rights, the outer webframe consists of societal norms in the
form of the public interest doctrine, the concentric circles of the web represent the
interests of various users of water, and the spoke-like strands radiating from the
center of the web represent "elemental incidents of property." Id. at 684-85. "If the
interest in question is not an irrevocable interest in the exclusive possession and use
of a discrete and marketable asset" it is "property for the purposes of due process or
common law claims, but not a full property right for purposes of regulatory takings
law." Id at 680, 686. Under this redefinition of property rights, appropriative water
rights are classified as limited property rights rather than full property rights due to
the requirements of beneficial use and issues related to transferability. Id. at 686.
Thus, even water rights in Colorado would not be full property rights protected
from regulatory takings.
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Using public trust and other related public servitude doctrines to
justify the public purposes for rainwater harvesting or expanding its
authorized scope in Colorado will be challenging for several reasons.
First, Colorado, like most western states, has not adopted the public
trust doctrine, and Colorado is one of the few prior appropriation
states that has not incorporated a public interest standard into its
statutory provisions on water rights.240 Even the Colorado General
Assembly's policy of promoting the conjunctive use of ground and
surface water is "subject to the preservation of other existing vested
rights in accordance with the law."241 Second, the interests protected
by rainwater harvesting legislation are not endangered species or the
aquatic health of a watershed, but simply the ability of property
owners and building residents to capture the first right to use water
242for household purposes and small-scale domestic irrigation.
Instead of protecting the public interest broadly, rainwater harvesting
legislation favors the narrower private interests of residential property
owners as junior appropriators over the private interests of more
senior appropriators, who are likely to be either agricultural irrigators
or their transferees. Although the notions of a public purpose may be
broad enough to encompass such transfers and satisfy the
constitutional requirement of a public use, a taking for a public use is
still a taking that triggers the requirement that the government pay
just compensation for the transfer.
C. Takings of Water Rights
As private property, water rights are protected from a takings under
the United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution by both
243the public use requirement and the just compensation requirement.
The Colorado Constitution provides even greater protection than the
United States Constitution because the latter requires just
240. Marcus J. Lock, Braving the Waters of Supreme Court Takings
Jurisprudence: Will the Fifth Amendment Protect Western Water Rights from
Federal Environmental Regulation?, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 76, 85-86 (2000).
See People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027-29 (Colo. 1979); Zellmer & Harder,
supra note 123, at 733-34.
241. Bd. Of Cnty. Commn'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP., 45 P.3d
693, 704-05 (Colo. 2002). Accord COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(2)(b) (2010).
242. See supra Part III.
243. See generally U.S. CONsT. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, COLO.
CONST. art. II, §§ 14-15.
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compensation for a taking of private property while Colorado
requires just compensation if property is "taken or damaged." 244 The
common requirement of a taking in both federal and state
constitutions raises the issue of whether the nature of the government
action rises to the level of a taking. Colorado protects water rights
from outright condemnation by both individuals and public entities
because the priority given to the use of water is a property right that
is protected under the constitutional language protecting property in
245general. While the status of water rights as compensable property
rights in the face of an outright condemnation are clear under
Colorado law, Colorado's current rainwater harvesting statutes do not
condemn any water rights and potentially more expansive statutes are
unlikely to do so.24 6 Instead, rainwater harvesting systems are
authorized and regulated.247 The United States Supreme Court has
used three separate standards to be used to analyze the nature of a
government regulatory action in response to a takings claim:
Our precedents stake out two categories of regulatory
action that generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth
Amendment purposes. First, where government requires an
owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her
property-however minor-it must provide just
compensation. . . . A second categorical rule applies to
regulations that completely deprive an owner of "all
244. Compare COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15 ("[P]rivate property shall not be taken
or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation."), with U.S.
CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."),
245. Game and Fish Comm. v. Farmers Irrigation Co., 426 P.2d 562, 565 (Colo.
1967). See § 31-15-708(b)(I) (2010) (recognizing that condemnation of water rights
by municipal water districts are takings that involve a private property right). The
Colorado statute states that:
if the taking of such water in such quantity materially interferes with or
impairs the vested right of any person residing upon such creek, gulch, or
stream or doing any milling or manufacturing business thereon, the
governing body shall first obtain the consent of such person or acquire the
right of domain by condemnation as prescribed by law and make full
compensation or satisfaction for all the damages thereby occasioned to
such person. Id.
246. See supra Part III.
247. Id.
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economically beneficial us[e]" of her property.... We held
in Lucas that the government must pay just compensation
for such "total regulatory takings," except to the extent that
"background principles of nuisance and property law"
independently restrict the owner's intended use of the
property.
Outside these two relatively narrow categories (and the
special context of land-use exactions. . .), regulatory
takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth
in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.
Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be
characterized as unified, these three inquiries (reflected in
Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central) share a common
touchstone. Each aims to identify regulatory actions that
are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which
government directly appropriates private property or ousts
the owner from his domain. Accordingly, each of these
tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that
government imposes upon private property rights. 248
If the taking can be characterized as regulatory taking that falls
short of a physical occupation or a "total regulatory taking," then the
government is likely to succeed in a complex balancing of the
burdens and benefits of the regulatory scheme. However, if the
regulatory taking can be characterized as a per se taking, then the
takings claimant is likely to succeed based on the application of a
categorical rule.249 The rainwater harvester and the state will want to
characterize the legislative authorization as the former, while senior
water rights holders will seek to apply the latter. As in other areas of
248. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). Although the
language of the Colorado Constitution's taking clause differs from the language of
the United States Constitution's taking clause, the Colorado courts have
"considered decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the federal
takings clause as a guide in determining what constitutes a taking under the
comparable provision of the Colorado Constitution." Central Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Simpson, 877 P.2d 335, 346 (Colo. 1994).
249. See James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Weighing the Need to Establish
Regulatory Takings Doctrine to Justify Takings Standards of Review and
Principles, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 315, 330 (2010).
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constitutional law related to individual rights, the legal standard that
is used determines the outcome.
1. Total Regulatory Takings of Water Rights
According to the United States Supreme Court in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, a total regulatory taking caused by a
"confiscatory regulation" is a per se taking requiring the payment of
just compensation. 25 0 Confiscatory regulations are "regulations that
prohibit all economically beneficial use of land" 251 and are subject to
the per se rule because "the total deprivation of beneficial use is,
from then landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation." 252 As the Court noted:
Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or
decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the
State's law of property and nuisance already place upon
land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must,
in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that
could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent
landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the
State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its
complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the
public generally, or otherwise.253
The per se nature of a total regulatory taking is nullified "only if
the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of [the owner's]
title to begin with." 254 Thus, both restrictions on uses that constitute
nuisances and restrictions on uses supported by the "background
principles" of state property law do not result in a compensable
taking even if the regulation prohibits all economically beneficial use
250. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
251. Id. Similarly, Colorado courts recognize that a government regulation that
prohibits all reasonable use of property is a taking. Williams v. City of Central, 907
P.2d 701, 703 (Colo. App. 1995).
252. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
253. Id. at 1029.
254. Id. at 1027.
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of the property. The senior appropriators who are likely to claim that
their vested water rights have been taken by rainwater harvesting are
downstream agricultural irrigators or purchasers of their water rights.
These senior appropriators should be able to demonstrate the validity
of their water property rights under Lucas due to the strength of
property rights in water in Colorado 25 5 Uses that are recognized as
"beneficial" by law should not be considered a nuisance,256 especially
since Colorado has historically prioritized such beneficial uses. 257 As
the United States Supreme Court has noted, "the fact that a particular
use ha[d] long been engaged in by similarly situated owners
ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition."258
A more fundamental issue is whether the per se rule for a total
regulatory taking applies to water rights based either on real or
personal property. In Lucas, the Court distinguished personal
property from real property and specifically focused on land noting:
[I]n the case of personal property, by reason of the State's
traditionally high degree of control over commercial
dealings, [the property owner] ought to be aware of the
possibility that new regulation might even render his
property economically worthless (at least if the property's
only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for
sale). In the case of land, however, we think the notion
pressed by the Council that title is somehow held subject to
the "implied limitation" that the State may subsequently
eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with
the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that
has become part of our constitutional culture.259
Critics of applying a regulatory takings analysis to water rights
assert that "the peculiarly limited character of property rights in water
more closely resembles personal property rights than real property
rights."26 0 These limitations include the loss of water rights due to
non-use or waste, the need to submit to a state approval process to
255. See supra Part IV.A.
256. Shepard, supra note 123, at 1105.
257. COLO. CONST. art XVI, § 6. See generally VRANESH, supra note 4, at 3-8.
258. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (citations omitted).
259. Id. at 1027-28.
260. Leshy, supra note 123, at 2013.
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transfer a water right, and the limitations placed on transferability
through the no-injury rule.26 1 In Colorado, water rights give rise to
262both personal and real property interests. However, despite this
potential for confusion, the Colorado Supreme Court clearly stated
that "water in possession is personal property; the right to divert
water from a stream is an interest in real estate." 263 Since the primary
property interest affected by rainwater harvesting is the right to the
prior use of water (via a diversion from a tributary surface or ground
water source), senior appropriators asserting takings claims in
response to more expansive rainwater harvesting legislation should
be able to overcome Lucas's personal property/real property
dichotomy. However, these senior appropriators will encounter
difficulties in overcoming Lucas's requirement that the regulation be
"confiscatory," and prohibit all of a property's economically
beneficial use.264 A rainwater harvester who obtains the first use
rights deprives a downstream senior appropriator of his prior use
rights conferred by his seniority. In addition, to the extent that the
rainwater harvester uses the water consumptively beyond what would
be lost to evapotranspiration, the senior appropriator also loses the
opportunity to use the full amount of water represented by its water
right. By doing so, pursuant to statutory authority, the rainwater
harvester seizes a usufructuary property right from the senior
appropriator, and this seized property right is recognized as a real
property interest under Colorado law. 265
In an over-appropriated stream system, such losses could represent
material injury to the water right.266 However, even if the senior
appropriator can prove the material injury, and thereby
constitutionally protect the property right, the materiality standard for
water rights is lower than the absolute standard of a total regulatory
takings. Even if materially injurious, the loss caused by rainwater
harvesting does not deprive the senior appropriator of all
economically beneficial use of the water right.267 The water right and
its accompanying priority continue to exist in the face of expanded
261. See id. at 1994-98, 2007-08.
262. VRANESH, supra note 4, at 30.
263. West End Irrigation Co. v. Garvey, 184 P.2d 476, 479 (Colo. 1947).
264. 505 U.S. at 1029.
265. See id. See also supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
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rainwater harvesting. The priority can be enforced against all other
junior appropriators except for the rainwater harvester. 268 In addition,
the senior appropriator receives the benefit of any return flow from
the rainwater harvester's authorized uses of the captured rainwater
based on the priority of its water right.269
2. Partial Regulatory Takings of Water Rights
A partial regulatory taking occurs when the regulation, although
retaining some economically beneficial use, ultimately "goes too far"
in its impact on the use of the property. 270 Unlike a total regulatory
taking, a partial regulatory taking is not a per se taking.2 71 Instead, as
set forth in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, courts are instructed to
balance the following factors: "[(i)] the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant . .. [(ii)] the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with [the claimant's] distinct investment-backed
expectations . . . [and (ii)] the character of the government action."2 72
"The first factor requires examining the change in the fair market
value of the property, accounting for realistic and probable uses." 273
Further, understanding the extent of the regulation's interference with
"distinct investment-backed expectations" includes examining the
reasonableness of the expected uses of the property given the
regulations in place at the time the property was acquired and the
foreseeability of further regulations. 274 The third factor "considers the
retroactive effect of the regulation and whether the regulation targets
an individual." 275 In connection with the third factor, the United
States Supreme Court noted that "a 'taking' may more readily be
found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from
268. See supra Part II.
269. See VRANESH, supra note 4, at 224-28.
270. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
271. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005).
272. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Accord Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of La Plata, 38 P.3d 59, 65 (Colo. 2001).
273. Huang, supra note 238, at 62.
274. See id.; see also Kathryn M. Casey, Comment, Water in the West: Vested
Water Rights Merit Protection under the Takings Clause, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 305, 346
(2003).
275. Huang, supra note 238, at 62.
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some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good." 2 76  A downstream senior
appropriator asserting a taking under legislation that expands the
scope of rainwater harvesting beyond the confines of Senate Bill 09-
080 and House Bill 09-1129 will struggle to sustain that claim under
a partial regulatory taking analysis. Even if the existence of a
property right that is constitutionally protected from a takings can be
demonstrated by showing a material injury to a senior water right,
satisfying the materiality standard does not necessarily satisfy the
multi-factor test for a partial regulatory takings.
Since the first prong of the partial regulatory taking analysis
involves a fact-specific inquiry into the economic impact of the
claim,277 the quantity of water lost to rainwater harvesting will likely
become as relevant as the loss of the priority. The absolute quantities
of water lost due to rainwater harvesting can be small. A rainwater
harvesting system for a typical family home with a 1,000 square foot
roof will at least collect "approximately 150 gallons of water from a
quarter inch of rain." 278 When the quantities of water lost due to
rainwater harvesting are measured in the hundreds of gallons while
the quantities represented by a downstream senior appropriator's
water rights are typically measured in acre-feet (i.e., hundreds of
thousands or millions of gallons or more),279 the disproportionate
relationship between the two is obvious. Further, with rainwater lost
due to evapotranspiration, only a fraction of the quantities lost due to
rainwater harvesting is part of the senior appropriator's water right. 280
Until rainwater harvesting becomes widespread in an over-
appropriated stream system, this small percentage of a small quantity
276. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted).
277. See id.
278. BEAUJON, supra note 46, at 1. See Findlay, supra note 57, at 80-81 (stating
that 1,000 square feet roof area can collect 600 gallons for every inch of rain).
279. See supra notes 44-45.
280. The Colorado State Engineer uses a seventy percent evapotranspiration rate
for native vegetation while a study indicates that evapotranspiration rates are even
higher. See supra notes 37-41, 108-10 and accompanying text. As more liberal
legislation allows rainwater harvesting in established urban areas, the
evapotranspiration rates may be even higher for water-hungry lawn grasses and
other non-native vegetation. Potential rainwater harvesters who do not fall within
the authorizations of Senate Bill 09-080 should hope that the pilot studies produced




suggests the economic impact of rainwater harvesting on senior
appropriators is de mimimus. Under the per se standard for physical
takings, the quantity of water taken in violation of the senior
appropriator's priority of use is an issue of damages and not liability,
even if it is de mimimus.2 81 However, the partial regulatory analysis'
examination of economic impact and interference with expectations
would make the quantity of water affected part of the liability
analysis, which would work against the senior appropriator in the
balancing of interests.
In addition, a senior appropriator's loss of priority to the use of
water due to rainwater harvesting alone will not be sufficient to
sustain a takings claim under the partial regulatory takings analysis.
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Penn Central:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In
deciding whether a particular governmental action has
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the
character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole ... .282
In Penn Central, the Court refused to solely examine the "takings"
effect of designating Grand Central Terminal as a landmark site on
the property interest in the airspace above the train station, even
though Penn Central had air rights and accompanying development
rights over the existing structure before the regulation and had lost
them as a result of the regulation.283 As the Court noted in a
subsequent case, "at least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of
property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a
taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."284 The
emphasis on the "property-as-a-whole" in a partial regulatory takings
281. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35
(1982).
282. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
283. See generally id. Prof. Epstein criticizes that conclusion noting that the Penn
Central's loss of air rights was no different from Pennsylvania Coal's loss of
mineral rights. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 64 (1985).
284. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
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analysis places the senior water rights owner asserting a takings claim
at a disadvantage. The most important stick in the bundle of rights a
senior appropriator loses to rainwater harvesting is the priority. For a
downstream senior appropriator who is also an agricultural irrigator,
his investment-backed expectations arising from this priority include
capital investments in land, irrigation infrastructure, and farm
equipment. For a municipality who purchases the agricultural
irrigator's water rights because of the agricultural irrigator's water
rights seniority, the investment-backed expectations encompass even
broader development issues. Priority protects the security of these
investment-backed expectations.285 However, the priority of a senior
appropriator's water right would not be completely affected by
expanded rainwater harvesting legislation because the senior
appropriator retains his priority against all users except for the
rainwater harvester.
Furthermore, priority is not the only stick in the bundle of rights.
Other sticks include the amount of water, the place of diversion, the
nature of the beneficial use, and the ability to sale, lease, or encumber
the water right.286 Until rainwater harvesting becomes more
widespread, the quantity of water affected is minimal and the
remaining rights continue unaffected.287 When placed in this larger
context, a court would likely find, as the Court found in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, that no taking occurred
because the claimant could still earn a reasonable return on its
investment. 2 88
Without a categorical rule, the senior appropriator asserting the
takings claim risks having more expansive rainwater harvesting
285. Tarlock, supra note 68, at 884. Priority is also essential to the proper
functioning of water markets. See Hobbs, supra note 159, at 44, 50-5 1.
286. See notes 122-52 and accompanying text.
287. See id.
288. 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978). The Colorado Constitution's taking clause does
not guarantee a maximum profit from the use of property. Nopro v. Town of
Cherry Hills Vill., 504 P.2d 344, 350 (Colo. 1972). See infra Section IV.C.3 for
the problems senior water rights owners encounter bringing a claim for substantial
damages, which uses the partial regulatory takings analysis. Prof. Leshy also notes
that the senior appropriator's investment-backed expectations are limited by the
vagaries of weather and drought as well as elements of the prior appropriation
doctrine, such the forfeiture or abandonment of water rights due to non-use or
waste. See Leshy, supra note 123, at 2007. See generally Huang, supra note 238,
at 77-79.
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legislation characterized as merely a regulatory "interference [that]
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good" subject to a partial
regulatory takings analysis.289 The common good that arises from
impacting established water rights to allow rainwater harvesting may
not be as compelling as the common good that arises from impacting
established water rights to protect endangered species and the aquatic
health of entire watersheds and ecosystems.290 However, rainwater
harvesting has its virtues as an inexpensive, low tech, efficient, and
green practice that enhances the domestic use of water. 291In a
balancing test where the economic impact on senior appropriators
and their investment-backed expectations is minimal due to the
quantity of water affected, at least until rainwater harvesting becomes
more widespread and is done on a larger scale, the virtues of
rainwater harvesting could very well tip the balance in favor of the
rainwater harvester.
3. Damage to Water Rights
A downstream senior appropriator who wants to challenge
legislation expanding rainwater harvesting may encounter difficulties
asserting a takings claim under the additional language of the
Colorado Constitution, which prohibits damaging of private property
without just compensation. 292 Courts note that this language provides
a property owner with a greater degree of protection than afforded
under the United States Constitution, which only uses the word
"taken." 293 The word "damaged" in the Colorado Constitution
provides relief for property rights that have not been physically taken
by the government but have been substantially damaged,294 and "'a
priority to the use of water for irrigation or domestic purposes is a
property right"' constitutionally protected from damage. 295 "I
289. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
290. See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
291. See supra Part I.
292. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15.
293. See Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Simpson, 877 P.2d 335, 347
(Colo. 1994) (noting that Colorado Constitution prohibits a governmental conduct
that the federal Constitution might not deemed as a taking).
294. Claasen v. City & County of Denver, 30 P.3d 710, 714 (Colo. App. 2000);
see also City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 179 (Colo. 1993).
295. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Farmers Irrigation Co., 426 P.2d 562, 565 (1967).
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determining whether government action results in substantial damage
to property, [the Colorado courts] have employed a multi-factor
balancing test similar to the analytical framework adopted by the
United States Supreme Court to resolve federal takings clause
issues," 296 i.e., the partial regulatory takings analysis of Penn Central.
Thus, for the same reasons why a senior appropriator would likely
fail in asserting a partial regulatory taking claim, the senior
appropriator would probably not succeed in bringing a claim for
substantial damages under the Colorado Constitution.
The Colorado Supreme Court's analysis in Central Colorado
Water Conservancy District v. Simpson,297 which addressed the
constitutionality of Senate Bill 120, reveals the challenges presented
in making a substantial damage claim. Senate Bill 120, adopted in
1989 by the Colorado General Assembly, exempted preexisting sand
and gravel operations from permitting and augmentation
requirements, despite the fact that excavating sand and gravel can
expose ground water to evaporation.298 Water rights owners claimed
that they were substantially damaged by this exemption, even though
they admitted that they could not prove that any particular water right
owner had been injured and that such proof was not scientifically
possible.299 Instead, junior appropriators argued that the South Platte
River basin was over-appropriated making injuries to existing water
rights inevitable since there was already insufficient water to satisfy
all the water rights in dry years.300 The Court refused to consider a
small decrease in the amount of water available for use as a
substantial damage and did not allow potential injuries to be equated
with substantial damages. 30 1 Merely affecting the priorities of and
reducing the amount of water available to junior appropriators,
especially intermittently during periods when water levels were low,
did not constitute a "substantial diminution of the economic value" of
existing water rights. 302 Instead, to meet this standard, the existing
water rights owners had to introduce evidence demonstrating a
difference in the value of the water rights before and after the
296. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 877 P.2d at 347.
297. 877 P.2d 335 (Colo. 1994).
298. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(11) (2010).






legislation was adopted, which they admittedly could not do. 303 In
addition, the Court noted that "any impact ... on the flows [of] the
South Platte River would be minimal."3 04
While a senior appropriator concerned about rainwater harvesting
could show "a unique or special injury which is different in kind
from, or not common to, the general public" 305 because of the unique
right to the use of water acquired by its priority of appropriation, the
senior appropriator would have difficulty showing substantial
damages under the fact-specific inquiry associated with the Penn
Central multi-factor balancing test. Of course, differences between a
taking claim resulting from rainwater harvesting and a taking claim
resulting from sand and gravel operations can be highlighted to
distinguish the decision Central Colorado Water Conservancy
District case. In the case of rainwater harvesting, the injury is to
senior water rights rather than to junior water rights, increasing the
likelihood that the injury is permanent rather than intermittent based
on water levels. In addition, unlike the sand and gravel operators
whose operations increased evaporation rates, the rainwater harvester
gains a first use of water in violation of the senior appropriators'
priorities.306 However, like the plaintiffs in Central Colorado Water
Conservancy District, the existing water rights owners in a rainwater
harvesting case will have trouble showing a substantial loss in the
value of their water rights as a result of more expansive rainwater
harvesting legislation and will face the argument that the amount of
303. Id. at 347-48
(The historical fluctuations in the water levels of the river ranged from a
low of 329,927 acre-feet to a high of over 1,000,000 acre-feet measured at
the Kersey gauge. Estimates of the amount of water lost through
evaporation from sand and gravel pits exempted by the provisions of S.B.
120 ranged from 6,296 acre-feet to 9,825 acre-feet. In light of the variance
in the South Platte's flows of approximately 700,000 acre-feet, the water
court's finding that the loss of 6,296 acre-feet through evaporation was
relatively minor is supported by the evidence and will not be disturbed on
appeal.)
304. Id. at 348
305. City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 179 (Colo. 1993). See
generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(describing the multi-factor balancing test).
306. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Simpson, 877 P.2d at 338.
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water affected is minimal, both due to the nature of the rainwater
harvester's authorized uses and due to evapotranspiration rates. 307
4. Per Se Physical Takings of Water Rights
A fourth type of analysis is available to a senior water rights owner
asserting a takings claim based on legislation expanding the scope of
rainwater harvesting beyond the confines of Senate Bill 09-080 and
House Bill 09-1129. A per se takings analysis is the most promising
for senior appropriators in Colorado but is also the most controversial
when applied to water rights. According to Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CA TV Corp., a permanent physical occupation of private
property, however minor, results in a per se taking, regardless of the
public interest advanced by the occupation.308 The United States
Supreme Court has noted:
Property rights in a physical thing have been described as
the rights "to possess, use and dispose of it." To the extent
that the government permanently occupies physical
property, it effectively destroys each of these rights. First,
the owner has no right to possess the occupied space
himself, and also has no power to exclude the occupier
from possession and use of the space. The power to exclude
has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured
strands in an owner's bundle of property rights. Second, the
permanent physical occupation of property forever denies
the owner any power to control the use of the property; he
not only cannot exclude others, but can make no
nonpossessory use of the property. Although deprivation of
the right to use and obtain a profit from property is not, in
every case, independently sufficient to establish a
taking .... Finally, even though the owner may retain the
bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer
or sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a
stranger will ordinarily empty the right of any value, since
307. See id
308. 458 U. S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
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the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the
property.309
With this type of per se taking, compensation is due even if the
taking does not result in the owner's total loss of the right to use the
property or has a minimal economic impact on the property owner.310
The United States Supreme Court subsequently noted that permanent
physical occupations resulting in a per se taking are "relatively rare,
easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront to individual
property rights." 311 Despite the assurance that this type of taking is
easily identified, legal scholars and courts have disagreed over
whether the per se takings rule that applies to physical occupations
applies to an interference with a senior appropriator's water rights.312
This point of conflict is critical. If a per se takings has occurred, the
only issue is the amount of just compensation. If not, then the more
complex partial regulatory takings analysis needs to be undertaken to
determine liability. As one Court of Federal Claims judge noted:
Despite the seeming simplicity of the question before us,
we do not find it an easy one to decide. Defendant, as we
have said, would have us start with the premise that a
takings claim arising out of regulatory restrictions on the
use of property must be evaluated under the Penn Central
criteria. Yet, those criteria-the character of the
government's action, its economic impact on the claimant,
and the extent to which it interferes with the claimant's
investment-backed expectations-and the balancing of
considerations those criteria require, bring us almost
immediately to the point plaintiff emphasizes here and the
point the court finds most troubling: that which defendant
labels simply as a passive restriction on use in reality
309. Id. at 435-36 (citations omitted).
310. See id. at 434-35.
311. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 324 (2002).
312. See infra notes 313-67. Prof. Epstein notes that his analysis of the rights to
possession and use of land, which affirms the importance of the right to exclude,
"can be extended with equal force to water rights cases," although he primarily
focuses on riparian water rights rather than appropriative water rights. EPSTEIN,
supra note 283, at 67.
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amounts to a transfer of value through which plaintiffs
right of use is diminished and the public right of use is
simultaneously enlarged. For plaintiff, then, this restriction
on use is seen as the functional equivalent of a physical
taking. Thus, the question becomes whether the restrictions
on plaintiffs water diversion, like a permanent physical
invasion, and the accompanying loss those restrictions
engender, constitute "government action of such a unique
character that it is a taking without regard to other factors a
court might ordinarily examine." 313
The current battle over whether a per se physical takings analysis
applies to water rights involves government-mandated reductions in
diversions by agricultural irrigators to maintain instream flows to
protect endangered species, primarily in California. 3 14 Rainwater
harvesting may potentially be the next battleground, with senior
appropriators and rainwater harvesters each hoping to build on court
decisions regarding the current battle between property rights and
315
environmental concerns.
A trio of pre-Loretto United States Supreme Court cases
establishes that a physical diversion of water affecting existing water
rights constitutes a per se physical taking.3 16 International Paper
involved a government requisition of hydroelectric power during
World War I that resulted in a physical redirection of water from a
mill used by the International Paper Company. 3 17 In Gerlach and
Dugan, the takings claims of downstream water rights owners arose
when a dam was built that interfered with the full, natural flow of a
313. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 105 (2007)
(quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432
(1982)).
314. See, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1281-
82 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
315. See, e.g., id.
316. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 623 (1963) (stating that any invasion to
any part of claimed water right amounted to a taking); United States v. Gerlach
Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 752-53 (1950) (recognizing water as a private
property right that is subject to a taking); Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
399, 408 (1931) (holding that a taking occurred when government took all the use
of the water power in a canal).
317. See 282 U.S. at 404-06.
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river.318 The dam had been built by the Bureau of Reclamation as part
of a larger project to impound and divert water to supply other water
users.3 19 In each case, the Court found a physical taking: in
International Paper based on the loss of the right to use the water;32 0
in Gerlach due to the loss of beneficial use; 321 and in Dugan based on
the interference with the water right.322 As the Court noted in Dugan:
A seizure of water rights need not necessarily be a physical
invasion of land. It may occur upstream, as here ....
Therefore, when the Government acted here "with the
purpose and effect of subordinating" the respondents' water
rights to the Project's uses "whenever it saw fit," "with the
result of depriving the owner of its profitable use [there
was] the imposition of such a servitude [as] would
constitute an appropriation of property for which
compensation should be made." 323
Therefore, a physical invasion is sufficient, but not necessary, at
least in cases involving a direct appropriation of water by the
government for its own use or for redistribution to third parties that
interferes with existing use rights. This rationale was recently used by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Casitas
Municipal Water District v. United States.324 This takings claim arose
318. See Dugan, 372 U.S. at 614-16; Gerlach, 339 U.S. at 729-30.
319. See Dugan, 372 U.S. at 614-16; Gerlach, 339 U.S. at 729-30.
320. See International Paper, 282 U.S. at 407.
321. See Gerlach, 339 U.S. at 752-53.
322. Dugan, 372 U.S. at 625.
323. Id. Dugan relied, in part, on United States v. Causby, in which a takings was
found in the absence of a physical invasion. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). Causby involved
the effect of low-level flights by military planes from an airfield leased by the
federal government on a small chicken farm. See id. at 258-59. The Court
concluded that the flights resulted in "an intrusion so immediate and direct as to
subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his
exploitation of it" and was essentially a taking of an easement of airspace. Id. at
265.
324. See 543 F.3d 1276, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A decision by the Federal Circuit
is especially noteworthy because of its intermediate appellate function over the
United States Court of Federal Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction via the
Tucker Act over takings claims brought against the United States. See 28 U.S.C. §
1491 (2010).
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when Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") required the plaintiff to
construct a fish ladder at a diversion dam and divert water through it
to protect an endangered trout in California. 325 The water-rights
owner claimed that the diversion resulted in a permanent water
loss. 326 The Casitas Court found that the BOR's requirements
constituted a per se physical taking because the BOR's requirements
physically directed water away from the plaintiffs use, permanently
taking the water and the right to use that water.32 7 Instead of merely
restricting water use, the BOR requirements directly appropriated
water to protecting an endangered species, a public purpose.328 This
decision highlights a critical distinction between partial regulatory
takings and per se physical takings since the parcel-as-a-whole rule329
does not apply, and the size, scope, and economic impact of the
physical invasion are immaterial to whether a takings has occurred.330
As the majority noted, "[a]lthough Casitas' right was only partially
impaired, in the physical taking jurisprudence any impairment is
sufficient." 331
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States
demonstrates the application of the per se physical takings standard
to find a taking in the absence of a permanent physical occupation or
diversion. 33 2 In Tulare, irrigation districts which received water from
the California Department of Water Resources' State Water Project
("California Water Department") experienced shortages when the
California Water Department reduced deliveries to provide instream
flows for migrating salmon in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.333
This reduction complied with provisions of the water service
contracts incorporating the requirements of the Endangered Species
Act.334 The court concluded that "[t]he federal government is
certainly free to preserve the fish; it must simply pay for the water it
325. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist., 543 F.3d at 1282.
326. Id. While Gerlach and Dugan primarily or exclusively involved riparian
water rights, the water rights affected in Casitas were clearly appropriative use
rights. See id. at 1292.
327. See id at 1295.
328. Id. at 1293.
329. See supra note 282.
330. Casitas Mun. Water Dist., 543 F.3d at 1288.
331. Id. at 1292.
332. See 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319-20 (2001).
333. See id at 314-16.
334. See id. at 314-15.
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takes to do so." 335 As in Dugan, the court relied on Causby336 and
Causby's application of per se reasoning to the taking of airspace to
address the thorny issue of how a usufructuary right can be physically
occupied:
While water rights present an admittedly unusual situation,
we think the Causby example is an instructive one. In the
context of water rights, a mere restriction on use-the
hallmark of a regulatory action-completely eviscerates the
right itself since plaintiffs' sole entitlement is to the use of
the water. See Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252-253 (1853)
("the right of property in water is usufructuary, and consists
not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use.").
Unlike other species of property where use restrictions may
limit some, but not all of the incidents of ownership, the
denial of a right to the use of water accomplishes a
complete extinction of all value. Thus, by limiting
plaintiffs' ability to use an amount of water to which they
would otherwise be entitled, the government has essentially
substituted itself as the beneficiary of the contract rights
with regard to that water and totally displaced the contract
holder. That complete occupation of property-an exclusive
possession of plaintiffs' water-use rights for preservation of
the fish-mirrors the invasion present in Causby. To the
extent, then, that the federal government, by preventing
plaintiffs from using the water to which they would
otherwise have been entitled, have rendered the
usufructuary right to that water valueless, they have thus
effected a physical taking. 337
Per Tulare, when Loretto is read in conjunction with Causby, the
physical occupation of the property becomes irrelevant when the
government interferes with the full right to use a vested water
right.
335. Id. at 324.
336. See supra note 323.
337. Tulare, at 319.
338. See Casey, supra note 278, at 337-38. Tulare has been discounted for failing
to properly analyze whether a property right exists under California law as an initial
question given the language of the water service contracts, California's reasonable
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Tulare recognizes the rights conferred on a water user by the prior
appropriation doctrine: the right to divert water from a certain place;
the right to a certain quantity of water at a certain time or over time;
the right to put this water to a certain beneficial use; and the right to a
certain priority for this use339 Given the importance of the water
right's priority, if that priority is taken, then the water right itself has
been taken, even if the government action is for the laudable goal of
facilitating rainwater harvesting by a junior appropriator. 340 While
protecting the right of exclusion was one of the rationales given in the
Loretto case for imposing a per se taking rule, the priority-of-use
plays a similar role in water rights and thus allows water rights to be
included within Loretto's per se taking rule. 34 1 Not only has the use
right been violated, but the right of possession, mentioned in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., is at risk. If not all the
use doctrine, and its adoption of the public trust doctrine. See Gray, supra note 122,
at 9-11. See also Huang, supra note 240, at 84-85; Zellner & Harder, supra note
123, at 739-40. A few years later in Klamath Irrigation District v. United States,
the Court of Federal Claims examined similar takings claims by agricultural
irrigators arising from a drought and the need for the Bureau of Reclamation to
reduce water deliveries to satisfy obligations under the Endangered Species Act. 67
Fed. Cl. 504, 512-14 (2005). The court granted the federal government's motion for
summary judgment, arguing that the irrigators' water interest was based on water
service contracts with the Bureau of Reclamation and those contracts had not been
breached due to state water law principles, the language of the contracts, and
sovereign defenses. Id. at 534, 536. Since the water rights at issue were vested in
United States and the United States was acting in a proprietary capacity when it
entered into the water service contracts rather than a sovereign capacity, the court
determined that the irrigators' cause of action for the reduced water deliveries was
for based on breach of contract rather than a takings. Id. at 523, 531-32. The court
criticized Tulare for not similarly examining the nature of the underlying property
rights in water, noting that "with all due respect, Tulare appears to be wrong on
some counts, incomplete on others and, distinguishable, at all events." Id. at 538.
However, in a telling comment on the complexity of water rights as property rights,
the United States Federal Circuit was required to certify questions of law to the
Oregon Supreme Court on the nature of the property right in water. See generally
Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 348 Ore. 15, 227 P.3d 1145 (2010);
Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 532 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
339. See supra Section IV.A; see also Gray, supra note 122, at 28; Leshy, supra
note 123, at 2010 (arguing as a devil's advocate); Shepard, supra note 123, at 1095-
96.
340. See Leshy, supra note 83, at 2010 (arguing as a devil's advocate).
341. See id. at 2011.
342. See 458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982).
[VOL. XXII
RAINWATER HARVESTING
water captured by a rainwater harvester is returned to the water
system and if the water source is already over-appropriated, then the
quantity of water the senior appropriator is allowed to divert and use
will be reduced. Thus, the application of the per se takings rule
associated with physical occupations to water rights is a logical
extension of the rule since the rationale of Loretto also applies to
appropriative water rights as usufructuary rights.34 3
Both Casitas and Tulare have been criticized,344 and, while some
of the criticisms may be valid, especially in the context of
maintaining instream flows to protect endangered species in
California, these arguments do not apply to rainwater harvesting in
Colorado.345 One criticism is that Casitas and Tulare go too far in
protecting property rights in water because California water rights are
subject to the reasonable use and public trust doctrines.346 However,
Colorado does not recognize the public trust doctrine and it onl
applies the reasonable use doctrine to nontributary ground water.3
Therefore, these doctrines would not apply to legislation expanding
the scope of rainwater harvesting.348 Furthermore, the public interest
in preserving rainwater harvesting is less compelling than the public
349interest in preserving endangered species.
Critics also argue that water rights contain nothing for the
government to physically possess or occupy because a water right is a
use right and the water-right owner does not own the molecules of
343. In an exercise in analogical reasoning, advocates of applying the per se
physical takings analysis of Loretto to regulatory takings of water rights note that
when the government reduces the water rights of an appropriator by diverting water
for other purposes or other users, the government has taken physical command of
the water right. See Shepard, supra note 123, at 1112. In the instream flow context,
this physical command becomes equivalent to a physical occupancy. Id.
344. See 543 F.3d 1276,1297-1300 (Mayer, J., dissenting in part); supra note
338. See generally John D. Echeverria, Is Regulation of Water a Constitutional
Taking?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 579 (2010).
345. See supra Part IV.A. 1, IV.B.
346. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist., 543 F.3d at 1297 (Mayer, J., dissenting in
part); see also Echeverria, supra note 344, at 592-93.
347. See supra Part IV.B.
348. See supra Part IV.A.-B.
349. See 16 U.S.C. 1531(a) (encouraging the states through federal financial
assistance and other system of incentives to protect endangered species).
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water. 3 0 Thus, the rights of possession and exclusion, the essential
property rights that the per se physical taking rule is designed to
protect, are nonexistent or limited within the water rights context.35 1
However, Gerlach and Dugan demonstrate that a water right can be
physically possessed behind a dam and exclude a downstream water
rights owner from the use of its vested property right.352 Similarly,
rainwater harvesting involves physical diversions and possessions via
the infrastructure of the collection system. 353
Critics further note an anomaly in applying a per se takings rule to
a water use right. A per se takings rule would provide a water use
right with more protection than a real property interest because, if use
right restrictions on real property were considered per se takings,
zoning laws and most environmental regulations restricting the use of
land would result in categorical takings.354 In addition, critics argue
that deeming any interference with the use of water a per se taking
would trigger just compensation requirements for even the
interference with a teaspoonful of water.355 However, these criticisms
themselves do not justify a taking, especially for a property right that
has been long recognized as "more valuable than the land [on] which
the water is applied" due to Colorado's semiarid conditions.35 6
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency 3 5 7 also renders the
legal viability of applying a per se takings analysis to appropriative
water rights uncertain. Tahoe-Sierra did not involve water rights, but
temporary moratoria on new residential development in Lake Tahoe
Basin to permit a government agency to study the impact of
development and to create a strategy for environmentally sound
350. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist., 543 F.3d at 1298 (Mayer, J., dissenting in
part); Echeverria, supra note 344, at 591-92; Leshy, supra note 123, at 2009. A
related criticism is the practical difficulty in effecting a permanent physical
occupation of water given its migratory nature. Huang, supra note 240, at 61.
351. See Echeverria, supra note 344, at 592; Leshy, supra note 123, at 2009. See
also Zellner & Harder, supra note 123, at 685-86.
352. See supra notes 316-23. See generally United States v. Gerlach Live Stock
Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1923).
353. See COURTNEY, supra note 2, at 3-4.
354. See Leshy, supra note 123, at 2010-11.
355. Id. at 2011.
356. City of Colo. Springs v. Yost, 249 P.2d 151, 153 (Colo. 1952).
357. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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growth.358 In response to a claim that a thirty-two month moratorium
constituted a takings, the Court refused to use the per se takings
analysis of Loretto noting:
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of
property for public use, on the one hand, and regulations
prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it
inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as
controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that
there has been a "regulatory taking," and vice versa. For the
same reason that we do not ask whether a physical
appropriation advances a substantial government interest or
whether it deprives the owner of all economically valuable
use, we do not apply our precedent from the physical
takings context to regulatory takings claims. Land-use
regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact
property values in some tangential way-often in completely
unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings
would transform government regulation into a luxury few
governments could afford. By contrast, physical
appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and
usually represent a greater affront to individual property
rights. "This case does not present the 'classi[c] taking' in
which the government directly appropriates private
property for its own use,". . . . instead the interference with
property rights "arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good... .359
As a result of Tahoe-Sierra, the per se takings rule only applies in
"the 'extraordinary case' in which a regulation permanently deprives
property of all value" 360 so that the property owner is only left with a
"token interest," 361 or where a physical appropriation due to the
regulation is "obvious and undisputed."362 Not surprisingly, critics of
358. Id. at 306.
359. Id. at 323-25.
360. Id. at 332.
361. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
362. Tahoe-Sierra, 533 U.S. at 322 n. 17.
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applying the per se takings rule for physical occupations to water
rights see a close connection between regulatory reductions of
appropriative water rights and the rationale of Tahoe-Sierra.363
The dilemma faced by Judge Wiese, the trial court judge in both
Tulare and Casitas, reveals the possible precedential effect of Tahoe-
Sierra on takings claims. In Casitas, Judge Wiese refused to apply
the per se physical takings rule as he did in the earlier Tulare case,
arguing that Penn Central's multi-factor balancing test for a partial
regulatory takings was the appropriate framework. 4 Although Judge
Wiese's rationale in Tulare had been criticized, he did not disavow
his application of the per se takings rule in Tulare to reductions in
365
water use rights. However, Judge Wiese ultimately felt
constrained from using the rationale in Tulare by Tahoe-Sierra.366
However, on appeal, Judge Wiese's holding was overruled by the
United States Federal Circuit with respect to his revised takings
analysis and decision. 367 Thus, the limitations Tahoe-Sierra placed
on applying the per se rule to regulatory takings do not apply to
physical diversions of water subject to vested water rights, such as
the fish ladder in Casitas or rainwater collection systems in Colorado.
An additional argument against applying the per se takings rule
focuses on the Court's refusal in Tahoe-Sierra to apply a per se
takings analysis based on the temporary nature of the government
regulation. 368 Critics of equating a regulatory taking to a physical
taking point to the temporary nature of any restriction on an
appropriator's water right, especially in the context of reductions in
water deliveries or diversions during droughts to maintain instream
flows for the benefit of endangered species. 36 9 The effect on water
rights in such circumstances is temporary since full water deliveries
later resume.37 0 However, given the importance of timing with a
363. See Leshy, supra note 123, at 2014-15.
364. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 100, 105-06
(2007).
365. See id.
366. Id. at 106.
367. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1296-97 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
368. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist., 76 Fed. Cl. at 105-06.
369. See Leshy, supra note 123, at 2007-08.
370. Id. See also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 74 (1980)
(holding that a state constitutional provision requiring shopping center owners to
permit individuals on their property to exercise free speech and petition rights
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water right, especially with growing seasons in agricultural irrigation,
a temporary occupation of a water right can be seen as an oxymoron
because the lost right to use the water is permanently lost at the point
and time the water is needed.37' Further, the taking created by
rainwater harvesting is not temporary since the statutory right to
capture rainwater would likely continue indefinitely. 372 As long as
rainwater is harvested, the full water right of the downstream senior
appropriator is affected in an over-appropriated stream system since
the priority is superseded. In addition, the full amount of water is not
allowed to enter the stream system since some of the uses that would
be authorized on an expanded basis, such as animal watering and
household purposes, are consumptive and thus, not temporary.
While the core issue of whether the per se takings rule can be
applied to government actions affecting water rights may be a close
one in the context of maintaining instream flows for endangered
species in California, the outcome is much clearer in the context of
rainwater harvesting in Colorado. As International Paper, Gerlach,
Dugan, and Casitas all indicate, a physical interference or diversion
of water authorized by the government is equivalent to a physical
occupation and subject to a per se takings analysis. 374 Even critics of
Tulare and Casitas concede that "taking water from one group of
farmers and giving it to another group of farmers" creates a more
compelling takings case than a "government's limitation on
represented an invasion that was temporary and limited in nature and was not a
taking).
371. Shepard, supra note 123, at 1113-14.
372. See supra Part III. But compare S.B. 09-080, 1st Sess. 1 (Colo. 2009)
(permanent nature) with H.B. 09-1129, 67th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. 2 (Colo. 2009)
(temporary nature).
373. See, e.g., supra Part III.A (discussing the uses authorized by Senate Bill 09-
080). If expanded legislation allowed rainwater harvesting by suburban
homeowners without requiring replacement water, the consumptive use would be
heightened as water from downspouts that ordinarily would have run off into storm
drains and surface water sources is captured and used. See generally supra Part III.
This effect would be further compounded for run off that would otherwise be
channeled into storm drains via impermeable surfaces, such as driveways and
parking lots, but is instead used consumptively. Id.
374. See supra notes 322-31 and accompanying text. But see Echeverria, supra
note 350, at 582, 611-14 ("[T]he ultimate question [in Casitas] of whether a
compensable taking occurred should be resolved based on the Nollan/Dollan
'exactions' tests, and the United States can easily meet the requirements of those
tests.").
2212011]
222 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
diversion[s] [ ] to protect the health of the aquatic environment as a
whole," even under a water law regime like the one in California that
has weaker property rights in water than Colorado. 37 5
Assuming that the per se takings rule applies to rainwater
harvesting generally and, in particular, future legislation that expands
the authorized scope of rainwater harvesting, a senior appropriator
claiming a taking faces another hurdle related to the scope of his
water property right. For Senate Bill 09-080, the senior appropriator's
water rights are presumed not to be affected because the rainwater
harvesting is limited to collection systems linked to small capacity
wells in designated ground water basins and exempt wells
elsewhere.376 For House Bill 09-1129, the senior appropriator's water
rights are not affected since replacement water must be supplied for
any water lost from the development-wide rainwater collection
system.3 77 Further rainwater harvesting legislation will only result in
a per se taking of the senior appropriator's water rights if the
expanded government authorization causes material injury to those
rights. 7 1
In Colorado, the concept of material injury limits the ability of
senior appropriators to block the activities of junior appropriators and
thus defines the outer limits of the private property right in water.
While even a de minimus impairment of a property right may be
sufficient for a physical takings, a water right affected by a physical
taking must be materially injured to first qualify as a property right
protected by the per se takings rule.379 Ironically, for a takings claim
involving water rights in Colorado and other prior appropriation
375. See Leshy, supra note 123, at 2008; see also Echeverria, supra note 350, at
597 (noting that restrictions on water use that result in the actual transfer of water
interests from one private owner to a new private owner involve "just the kind of
property restrictions 'of an unusually serious character' [citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at
426] which, according to the Supreme Court, warrants per se takings treatment"
(quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982)).
376. See supra Section III.A.
377. See supra Section III.B.
378. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-502(2)(a) (2010).
379. The material injury standard and the existence of a protectable property
right would also be a key factor in both the total and partial regulatory takings
analyses if the standards themselves did not pose such difficult challenges for a




states that use the material injury standard, the application of a per se
takings standard ultimately requires an analysis of the size, scope,
and economic impact of the physical invasion. 380  However, the
material injury requirement of Colorado water law is not necessarily
a "Trojan horse" that allows the partial regulatory takings analysis,
with its deference to government action, to replace the per se physical
takings standard. Instead, what constitutes a material injury by a
rainwater harvester as a junior appropriator to the water right of a
downstream senior appropriator and how materiality is proven are
separate matters of state law. 38 In determining whether a junior
appropriator's diversions should be discontinued in whole or in part
due to the materiality of the injury, the Colorado Division of Water
Resources must examine:
[A]ll factors which will determine in each case the amount
of water such discontinuance will make available to such
senior priorities at the time and place of their need. Such
factors include the current and prospective volumes of
water in and tributary to the stream [flow] from which the
diversion is being made; distance and type of stream bed
between the diversion points; the various velocities of this
water, both surface and underground; the probable duration
of the available flow; and the predictable return flow to the
affected stream. 382
380. See supra note 330 and accompanying text. Determining whether a senior
water right has been materially injured reinforces the difficulty in keeping a per se
physical takings analysis separated from a partial regulatory takings analysis. See
Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
307, 364 (2007) (noting the powerful incentive of takings claimants to argue a
physical rather than a regulatory theory of the case to avoid the evidentiary burden
of the multi-factor balancing test, contributing to the blurring between the two).
381. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-502(2)(a) (2010).
382. Id. The material injury standard applies whether the diversions are directly
from the surface stream, via a well pumping tributary ground water, or a well
pumping what was originally thought to be nontributary designated ground water.
See generally Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 147 P.3d 20, 33 (Colo.
2006) (well pumping designated ground water); SRJ I Venture v. Smith Cattle, Inc.
820 P.2d 341, 346 (Colo. 1991) (well pumping tributary ground water); City of
Colo. Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo. 1961) (diversion from stream).
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As this nonexclusive statutory list of factors indicates, the issue of
material injury is highly fact specific and requires technical
information developed by hydrologists, water engineers, and other
experts.383 In an application for a new diversion, the burden of proof
shifts between the junior appropriator applying for decreed water
right and the senior appropriator opposing the application. The junior
appropriator bears the initial burden of producing evidence sufficient
to establish a prima facie case that the proposed diversion will be
384non-injurious. If the junior appropriator establishes a prima facie
case, then the burden shifts to the senior appropriator who must
present evidence that the proposed diversion will injure his or her
water right.385 However, "the ultimate burden of showing absence of
injurious effect by a preponderance of the evidence where contrary
evidence of injury has been presented continues to rest on the
applicant [i.e., the junior appropriator]."386 If the senior appropriator
cannot meet its burden, then water is available for appropriation and
the senior appropriator cannot preclude the diversion. 8 If the junior
appropriator cannot meet its burden, then the application for a
decreed water right must be denied.388
The viability of a takings claim by a downstream senior
appropriator in response to legislation that expands the scope of
rainwater harvesting depends on who has the burden of proof and
how that burden can be satisfied. Even in a shifting burden of proof
scheme, placing the ultimate burden of proof on the state rather than
the senior appropriator in the rainwater harvesting context is
equitable since the takings is a physical one.389 In addition, shifting
the burden of proof between the state as the initiator and the senior
appropriator as objector is consistent with other areas of Colorado
water law that place the ultimate burden of proof on the party
383. See, e.g., State Eng'r v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d 496, 508 (Colo.
1993).
384. § 37-92-304(3).
385. See Danielson v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 791 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Colo. 1990).
386. Simpson v. Yale Invs., Inc., 886 P.2d, 689, 697 (Colo. 1994).
387. See, e.g., Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows,
550 P.2d 288, 293-94 (Colo. 1976).
388. See WATER CT. COMM., COLO. SUP. CT., NoN-ATTORNEY's GUIDEBOOK TO
COLORADO WATER COURTS 16, 19-20, http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/
File/SelfHelp/Non-AttorneysGuidebook toColoradoWaterCourtsFinal.pdf.
389. See supra note 74.
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initiating a change in water rights.390 In these scenarios, such as a
transfer of a water right where the senior appropriator is typically the
applicant and the junior appropriator is typically the objector, the
change potentially impairs vested water rights. 39 1 The primary
purpose of a change proceeding is to ensure that the change to a
water right is limited in quantity to the appropriator's "historic
beneficial consumptive use." 392 "One of the basic tenets of Colorado
water law is that junior appropriators are entitled to maintenance of
conditions on the stream existing at the time of their respective
appropriations." 393 Because the water property right is limited to
actual, historical use and junior appropriators are entitled to rely on
the return flow from the activities of upstream appropriators, a
change in a water right cannot enlarge an existing water right,
especially if doing so will injure the water rights of junior
appropriators.394 To prevent such injury, protective conditions can be
attached to the change in the water right.39 5 Just as this no-injury rule
in the context of changes in water rights protects the expectations of
junior appropriators, the material injury rule in the context of new
diversions protects the expectations of senior appropriators to the
priority and amount of water represented by their water rights.
Applying the same scheme of burden of proof shifting in both cases
reinforces these protections. Given the rationale behind burden of
proof shifting, the same scheme should apply when evaluating the
nature and extent of the injury to water rights in the context of a
regulatory takings analysis.
Similarly, "the right to store water [from] a natural stream for later
application to a beneficial use," which is analogous to rainwater
harvesting, is a right protected under the prior appropriation doctrine
established by the Colorado Constitution.396 However, "no water
390. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (2010); see also City of Thornton v.
Bijou Irrigation, Co., 926 P.2d 1, 87-8 (Colo. 1996).
391. See City of Boulder v. Boulder &Left Hand Ditch Co., 557 P.2d 1182, 1184
(Colo. 1976).
392. Trail's End Ranch LLC v. Colo. Div. of Water Res., 91 P.3d 1058, 1063
(Colo. 2004).
393. City of Thornton, 926 P.2d at 80.
394. See City of Boulder, 557 P.2d at 1184; see also Santa Fe. Trail Ranches
Prop. Owners Ass'n. v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 (Colo. 1999).
395. See § 37-92-305(4)(a).
396. § 37-87-101(1)(a). Although water storage is within the prior appropriation
doctrine and the rainwater harvesting contemplated by Senate Bill 09-080 is
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storage facility may be operated in such a manner as to cause material
injury to the senior appropriative rights of others."397 In an
application for a decree allowing the artificial recharge and storage of
water in an underground aquifer, the applicant bears the burden of
demonstrating that such activity will not materially injure the decreed
water rights of the aquifer's senior surface or ground water users.3 98
Again, the burden of proof is placed on the initiator of the activity,
which is the state in cases regarding rainwater harvesting. 399
Whether the ultimate burden of proof is placed on the senior
appropriator, as the party asserting the takings claim, or a scheme of
shifting burdens of proof between the state and the senior
appropriator is used, the senior appropriator must meet its evidentiary
burden. Given the cost of developing technical information, the
evidentiary presumptions that a court is willing to make become
crucial.400
In the context of plans of augmentation, which employ the same
scheme of burden of proof shifting as new diversions and changes in
water rights,401 the Colorado Supreme Court has stated that "injury
'must be demonstrated by evidential facts and not potentialities."' 402
However, with plans of augmentation, the Colorado Supreme Court
has presumed that tributary ground water depletions injure senior
exempt from the prior appropriation doctrine, even a seemingly exempt activity can
still injure senior water rights. See Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 147
P.3d 20, 32 (Colo. 2006). See generally §§ 37-92-602 (1)(a)-(g) (enumerating
exemptions).
397. See § 37-87-101(1)(a).
398. Bd. of Cnty. Commn'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP., 45 P.3d
693, 705 (Colo. 2002).
399. See e.g., id.
400. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. The information developed by
the ten pilot programs authorized by House Bill 09-1129, such as precipitation
capture efficiencies, return flow patterns, and native plant consumption, would
provide the state with the necessary evidence, especially for an expanded rainwater
harvesting scheme that avoids injuring vested water rights based on net depletions
and augmentations. See supra Section III.B. One issue is whether information from
ten widely scatter sites will be sufficient to meet the state's burden of proof for
additional sites in other locations.
401. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (2010).
402. Simpson v. Yale Invs. , 886 P.2d 689, 696 (Colo. 1994) (quoting Brighton
Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116, 119-20 (Colo. 1951).
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surface water rights when a stream system is over-appropriated. In
addition, a prima facie case of material injury to senior water rights
can be established by a preponderance of evidence of injury to senior
appropriators generally rather than to a particular senior water rights
owner.404 Thus, relative to the burden placed on the senior
appropriator to show substantial damage to water rights via a multi-
factor balancing test used in partial regulatory takings, the burden of
proving material injury to water rights in the physical takings context
is lower based on the presumptions that Colorado courts are willing
to make. With this lower burden, the material injury issue should not
prevent a senior appropriator from taking advantage of the per se
physical takings standard.
D. Just Compensation
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. "the issue of the amount of
compensation that is due, on which we express no opinion, is a matter
for the state courts to consider on remand."4 05 In Colorado, the legal
remedy of damages is usually the appropriate remedy and the
preferred method of calculating damages, at least in eminent domain
actions, is the fair and reasonable market value of the property.40 6
The property right holder bears the burden of "establishing the
existence of damages and the amount of compensation."407 Possible
methods of calculating market value include looking at comparable
sales transactions or the replacement value for the amount of water
taken out of priority at the time of the taking.408 For a claim
involving rainwater harvesting, this amount will be small and
difficult to trace from the activities of rainwater harvesters to a given
senior water rights owner. A downstream senior appropriator who
asserts that rainwater harvesting constitutes a taking may not seek
just compensation for a total regulatory taking and will likely fail
under either a claim for a partial regulatory taking or substantial
403. Buffalo Park Dev. Co. v. Mountain Mut. Reservoir Co., 195 P.3d 674, 685
(Colo. 2008).
404. See id at 684-85.
405. 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
406. Leadville Water Co. v. Parkville Water Dist., 436 P.2d 659, 660 (Colo.
1967); see also City of Colo. Springs v. Crumb, 364 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Colo. 1961).
407. Troiano v. Colo. Dept. of Hwys, 463 P.2d 448, 451 (Colo. 1969).
408. See Davenport & Bell, supra note 177, at 60-63, 65.
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damages. 409  The de minimus nature of the quantity of water
appropriated undermines a claim for liability as well as damages. In
the multi-factor balancing test used in both a partial regulatory
takings and a substantial damages analysis, the small quantities of
water at issue minimize both the economic impact of any more
expansive rainwater harvesting legislation and the extent of its
interference with senior appropriator's investment-backed
410
expectations and the substantiality of damages. By definition, de
minimus damages are not substantial enough to trigger the
*411
requirement of just compensation.
By contrast, in a per se physical taking analysis, the small
quantities of water at issue can lead to damages. In Loretto, the fact
that the physical invasion arguably increased the value of New York
City apartments by allowing them to be wired for cable television,
did not prevent the United States Supreme Court from declaring that
the requirement amounted to taking that constitutionally required just
compensation.412 In Dugan, the United States Supreme Court
explicitly declined to hold that "the absence of specificity as to the
amount of water to be taken prevents the assessment of damage."413
In Tulare, the fact that "the restrictions resulted in an overall
reduction in water availability of approximately 0.11% and 2.92%"
did not prevent a ruling in favor of the senior appropriators. 4 14 Given
the presumptions that favor the senior appropriator in determining the
materiality of the injury, the small quantities of water affected are
only relevant to the issue of damages, at least until rainwater
harvesting becomes more widespread and involves more and larger
collection systems.
However, determining damages and just compensation is no small
hurdle for senior appropriators challenging expanded rainwater
legislation in Colorado. Unless a court could be persuaded that
409. See supra Part IV.C.3.
410. See Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Simpson, 877 P.2d 335, 346-48
(Colo. 1994).
411. See, e.g., id. at 348; Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs of La Plata, 38 P.3d 59, 65-66 (Colo. 2001).
412. See LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A
CHANGING AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWER AND CONSTRAINTS 655 (6th ed.
2007).
413. 372 U.S. 609, 623 (1963).
414. Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered
Species Act, and the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 560 (2002).
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rainwater harvesting obliterates a senior appropriator's priority and
destroys the water right,415 the cost of developing evidence to meet
the burden of establishing the fact and amount of damages could
outweigh the damages, especially for a more junior appropriator as
the more senior water rights are taken into account.416 Downstream
senior appropriators would need to show that the stream system was
over-appropriated, use discovery to determine the amount of
rainwater captured by each rainwater harvester in the stream system,
develop or take advantage of existing technical evidence to account
factors such as runoff and evapotranspiration rates, and establish
market values.417 Given the problem of proving damages and the
costs of litigation for all involved, incorporating market solutions
with the state acting as a market maker in any expanded rainwater
harvesting legislation may be a better alternative than simply
allowing that legislation to be challenged by takings claims.
CONCLUSION
Recent scholarship at the intersection of water rights and regulatory
takings focuses on reductions in water diversions imposed on senior
agricultural appropriators required by the Endangered Species Act to
maintain instream flows on rivers and streams to protect aquatic
species, primarily in California.4 18  The right to water in the
American West and the control of that water are critical and
contentious issues, so it is not surprising that the scholarship on the
issue of whether such regulatory action amounts to a takings has
produced divergent views. The outcome of various lawsuits brought
by agricultural irrigators parallels the divide among legal scholars.4 19
However, the most recent cases in key appellate courts, such as
Casitas in the Federal Circuit and the Tenth Circuit's decision
vacating multiple district court opinions relating to instream flows to
protect the Rio Grande silvery minnow on mootness grounds,420
415. See Lock, supra note 240, at 100.
416. See supra notes 79, 303 and accompanying text.
417. See generally Part IV.C (discussing factors necessary to show total and
partial takings).
418. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 344-75 and accompanying text.
420. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096,
1097, 1133 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States,
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benefit the interests of senior water rights holders. The recent
passage of rainwater harvesting legislation in Colorado provides a
new opportunity to explore whether water property rights are
protected from a regulatory taking. The public interest at stake with
rainwater harvesting is weaker than with instream flows, since the
421goal is not to protect the environment and endangered species.
Instead, rainwater harvesting legislation places the interests of
residential property owners and lessees before the interests senior
water rights owners, who tend to be agricultural irrigators and their
transferees.422 Under the prior appropriation doctrine, senior
appropriators are entitled to the amount of water and priority of use
represented by their water rights, so rainwater harvesting legislation
circumvents senior water rights by allowing a rainwater harvester as a
junior appropriator to have the prior, consumptive use of rainwater.423
By effectively transferring water property rights from one private
party to another private party, such legislation potentially creates a
takings. Current Colorado rainwater harvesting statutes avoid this
problem of creating out-of-priority diversions by working within the
424
confines of the prior appropriation doctrine. However, the current
statutes contemplate further rainwater harvesting legislation.425
The two key issues that determine the outcome in a regulatory
takings favor the senior water rights owner - the nature of the private
property right and the nature of the government action.426 Private
property rights in water in Colorado are clear and strong, and even
the requirement of material injury is satisfied by burdens of proof and
presumptions that favor the senior water rights owner.427 The
normally difficult issue of determining the nature of the government
action in connection with water rights is less difficult with rainwater
harvesting given the physical diversion of rainwater and the
importance placed on protecting a water right's priority in
543 F.3d 1276, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that a Bureau of Reclamation
directive to divert water to operate a fish ladder constituted an "uncompensated
physical taking").
421. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
422. Id.
423. See supra Part II. .
424. Id.
425. See supra Part IV.A.2.
426. See supra Part IV.C.
427. See supra notes 382-404 and accompanying text.
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Colorado.4 28 These two factors indicate that a per se physical takings
standard should apply, and, under this standard, the property rights
owner tends to prevail over the state.
Despite these advantages, the outcome is far from certain. The
senior water rights owner still has the difficult issue of proving
damages to obtain just compensation.429 An even larger issue is
whether the per se physical takings standard even applies to water
rights given the United States Supreme Court's decision and rationale
in Tahoe-Sierra.4 30 If not, then the senior water rights owner must
pursue its takings claim under the less favorable partial regulatory
takings standard of Penn Central or the similar substantial damages
standard under the Colorado Constitution.43 1 In the absence of a
categorical rule, rainwater harvesting in Colorado could be freed
from the full effect of the prior appropriation doctrine. However,
given the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Gerlach and
Dugan and the physical diversion and storage of water with a
rainwater collection system, the risk of losing the per se rule appears
to be lower for takings in the context of rainwater harvesting than
takings in the context of maintaining instream flows for endangered
432
species.
The political clout of Colorado's urban areas combined with over
appropriated water systems and climate change will pressure the state
legislature to broaden rainwater harvesting beyond the confines of
Senate Bill 09-080 and House Bill 09-1129. The Colorado General
Assembly would do well to heed property rights in water and the
protections afforded water rights by the prior appropriation doctrine
in crafting future rainwater harvesting legislation. Failing to include
concepts such as net depletion and to require replacement water via
plans of augmentation risks a backlash by senior water rights owners
in the form of a valid claim for a regulatory taking based on the per
se physical taking standard. Despite the frustrations of suburban
homeowners who want to install rain barrels, rainwater harvesting
legislation should not be an occasion to weaken property rights in
water because doing so carries a larger cost. Uncertain priorities in
appropriative water rights undermine water markets and inhibit water
428. See supra notes 159-64, 374 and accompanying text.
429. See supra Part IV.C.3.
430. See supra notes 357-63 and accompanying text.
431. See supra Part IV.C.4.
432. See id
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transfers in response to demands by urban water users, further
locking water rights into their historical agricultural uses.
